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1. INTRODUCTION
Brazil has won five of the eighteen World Cup tournaments
held since 1930, more than any other country.' If soccer's world
governing body, FIFA, wanted to create an approach to soccer
development to help "backward" countries such as the United
States become internationally competitive, would we expect FIFA
to study Brazil's youth soccer system? Of course we would. We
would accept that FIFA staff would bring to the project
preconceived ideas and assumptions, and we would expect them
to study successful countries other than Brazil, since not all of
Brazil's practices are likely to be appropriate at all times, in all
places. But we would expect FIFA to develop its approach based
1 Larry Rohter, In Brazil, Unpaved Path to Excellence, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2006,
§ 8, at 1 ("How does Brazil do it? Year after year, World Cup after World Cup,
soccer stars seem to roll out of here like cars off a factory assembly line.").
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on studies of successful national soccer programs, and given
Brazil's success, we would certainly expect that it would take
Brazil's experience seriously. At worst we would expect FIFA to
check the proposals it developed against actual national
experiences, and a program for soccer development that was
largely contradicted by Brazil's historical experience would hardly
be taken seriously.
Now, what if the world needed a theory addressing the role of
law in economic development, but those responsible proceeded to
develop that theory without paying serious attention to the role
that law played in modern history's leading economic
development success stories, for example, the "miracle" economies
of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 2 in the latter half of the
twentieth century? Strange as it sounds, this is exactly what has
happened. As this Article will show, the law and development
community3 has produced over recent decades a series of theories
on law and development, none of which were derived from close
study of Northeast Asia, and none of which fit very well with the
existing evidence of how law actually did function in Northeast
Asia during rapid economic development. Not surprisingly, there
also has not been a history of trying to test the specific claims of
these theories empirically against the Northeast Asian
development success story.
Why does the world need a theory of law and development?
Beyond our normal interest in understanding law's relation to
social life, international financial institutions ("IFIs") such as the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and the
Asian Development Bank devote enormous resources to programs
advocating change in the legal systems of countries under their
influence. Likewise, law and development initiatives play an
important role in the work of major bilateral development
assistance providers such as the United States Agency for
2 Hereinafter "Northeast Asia."
3 The law and development community consists largely of academics and
development practitioners who focus on the socio-economic role of law in
supporting development, variously defined. Academic participants have come
largely from social science and law faculties in Europe and the United States,
while practitioners have come from international financial institutions such as the
World Bank, and from national development aid bureaucracies such as USAID.
The idea of "law and development" as a field at the intersection of economic
thought, legal thought, and development agency practices is expressed in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek
& Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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International Development ("USAID"),4 Germany's Gemeinschaft
fir technische Zusammenarbeit ("GTZ"),5 and the Japan International
Cooperation Agency ("JICA").6 More importantly, these initiatives
affect the lives of billions of people in developing countries, since
even governments which maintain a high degree of sovereign
autonomy, such as those of China and India, can be affected by the
ideas, ideologies and policies that emanate from the World Bank or
other law and development actors. And while the typical initiative
targets the legal system of a poor country, or one that is
transitioning from a planned to a market economy, it is important
to remember that South Korea was the world's eleventh largest
economy and a member of the OECD when, as a result of the Asian
Financial Crisis and Korea's resulting need for international
assistance, its legal system became the target of IMF, World Bank,
and United States pressure.7
Today's histories of law and development typically begin
during the modernization era of the 1950s and 1960s, though this
fails to address the central role of law and legal imposition in the
era of colonization.8 However, it is fair to date the current mode of
4 For a list of law and development projects at USAID see USAID Economic
Growth & Trade, http://www.usaid.gov/our work/ economic-growthand
_trade/eg/lir whereactive.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007); USAID Democracy &
Governance, http://www.usaid.gov/ourwork/democracy-and-governance
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
5 On the GTZ's law and development work in China, see GTZ Legal
Advisory Service, http://www.gtz-legal-reform.org.cn/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2007).
6 Japan channels many of its law and development efforts through the
International Cooperation Department ("ICD") of the Ministry of Justice's
Research and Training Institute in Osaka. For more information, see The
International Cooperation Department, http://web.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/
MEOM/meom-01-05.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). For a discussion of Japan's
current law and development initiatives, see generally Yoshiharu Matsuura,
Toward A New Generation of Comparative Law: A Framework for Bilateral Collaboration
in Law & Development Projects in Asia, 23 WIS. INT'L L. J. 233 (2005); Veronica L.
Taylor, New Markets, New Commodity: Japanese Legal Technical Assistance, 23 WIs.
INT'L L.J. 251 (2005); Hikaru Oguchi, The Bureaucratic Sectionalism of Japan's
Technical Cooperation in the Legal and Judicial Field: The Case of Legal
Assistance in Laos (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
7 See Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate
Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
61, 65 (1999) (describing the aftermath of Korea's financial turmoil in 1997). Korea
is also engaged in law and development activities of its own through the Legal
Research and Training Institute. See Legal Research & Training Institute, http://
www.lrti.go.kr/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
8 For example, lawyers played central roles in American colonial rule in the
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law and development activities to the 1960s, when primarily
Western governments, institutions, and academics became
involved with the legal systems of many developing and newly-
independent countries. 9  Following decades of law and
development activity, the world also came to recognize Northeast
Asia's economic miracle and the region's outstanding economic
performance became the subject of extensive analysis and debate
by students of economic development from various disciplines.10
Surprisingly, however, given Northeast Asia's unquestioned
economic success, the region's legal systems have been largely
overlooked as potential sources of knowledge concerning the
fundamental questions of law and development." Despite a rich
Western language literature on Northeast Asian legal systems, 12
and despite ventures by some scholars of Northeast Asian law into
law and development debates, 3 it is no overstatement to say that
Philippines, which has left a lasting legacy on Philippine law. See PAUL D.
CARRINGTON, SPREADING AMERICA'S WORD: STORIES OF ITS LAWYER-MISSIONARIES
(2005) (exploring over two centuries of efforts to replicate the laws and
governments of foreign countries).
9 Though rarely mentioned now in Western discussions of law and
development, the socialist world had its own version of law and development,
supporting the spread of socialist legal institutions, for example from the Soviet
Union to China in the 1950s. Both Western and socialist law and development
initiatives were parallel aspects of the larger Cold War contest for global
influence.
10 Economics, political science, and sociology are all well represented. The
literature on Northeast Asian development is truly voluminous, and includes
country-specific studies, as well as regionally-focused works.
11 An exception is THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN
ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT, 1960-1995 (Katherina Pistor & Philip A. Wellons, eds.,
1999) (exploring competing theories about law and its relation to economic
development).
12 There is of course an enormous amount of literature on Northeast Asian
legal systems in Korean, Chinese, and Japanese language, but this is even less
likely to appear in the law and development literature than works on Northeast
Asia law in Western languages.
13 See, e.g., J. MARK RAMSEYER, ODD MARKETS IN JAPANESE HISTORY (1996)
(explaining how the Japanese legal system generally promoted mutually
advantageous deals between private interests); LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST
AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (Christoph Antons ed., 2003) (citing Japan and Singapore
role models for Asian development and examining development related business
laws in countries such as China, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the
Philippines); LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999) (suggesting that the notions of
judicial organization and independence need to be located in the specific
ideological and political context of East Asia); Donald C. Clarke, Economic
Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89
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scholarship on Northeast Asian law has played an insignificant
role in the theoretical literature on law and development.
This lack of interest would not be a problem if Northeast Asia's
economies were neither exceptionally good nor exceptionally bad.
Thus, it could be argued that studying their legal systems would
probably yield nothing very useful on the questions of law and
development. Yet that, of course, is not the case. Northeast Asia's
economies are the best examples we have of sustained and
equitably distributed industrialization and development. Given
their indisputable record of economic and social success, and given
the fact that literature on Northeast Asian legal systems is widely
available, the failure to place Northeast Asia at the core of law and
development theorizing seems impossible to justify. This Article
addresses that discrepancy in two ways. First, the dominant law
and development orthodoxies will be examined through the lens of
widely accepted understandings about the functioning of
Northeast Asia's legal orders during the region's high growth
decades. 14 To the extent these orthodoxies cannot accommodate
the Northeast Asian experience, it will be argued, they are deeply
inadequate. In addition to this critical dimension, however, this
(2003) (discussing the relationship between property and contract rights and
economic development in China); Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic
Development? Evidence From East Asia, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 829 (2000) (re-
emphasizing the importance of legal institutions to economic growth); Frank K.
Upham, Comment, Speculations on Legal Informality: On Winn's "Relational Practices
and the Marginalization of Law," 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 233 (1994) (discussing the
World Bank's efforts to address "governance issues in borrowing countries"); Jane
Kaufman Winn, Relational Practices and the Marginalization of Law: Informal Practices
of Small Businesses in Taiwan, 28 LAW & Soc'y REV. 193 (1994) (discussing how the
use of informal financing techniques by small businesses in Taiwan contributed to
the development of Taiwan's economy); William P. Alford, The More Law, the
More... ? Measuring Legal Reform in the People's Republic of China (Stanford Univ.,
Ctr. for Research on Econ. Dev. and Policy Reform, Working Paper No. 59, 2000)
(examining the relationship between legal development and economic growth);
Donald C. Clarke, Peter Murrell & Susan Whiting, The Role of Law in China's
Economic Development (George Washington Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 187, 2006) (surveying China's legal system in the economic
growth era); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 30, 2002) (using the United States
and post-World War Japan as examples of economies that have flourished under
systems without formalist rules of law by developing a mix of formal and
informal mechanisms to raise talent and capital).
14 Widely held understandings can be misleading or simply wrong, of course,
especially with respect to foreign legal systems. Every effort will therefore be
made to subject commonly held notions to appropriate scrutiny; however, this
essay is not primarily a work of comparative law.
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Article will also articulate a positive vision of what the study of
Northeast Asian law can contribute to law and development,
offering a new approach to law and development activities
informed by Northeast Asia's experience. It should not "take a
theory to beat a theory." Strictly speaking, we should be willing to
discard a theory once it has been disproved by evidence, and this
should include our prevailing theories on law and economic
development. On the other hand, the law and development efforts
underway throughout the world are not going to stop even if their
intellectual underpinnings are pulled away. The initiatives are
going to continue, and the people actually doing the work are
going to need some kind of coherent intellectual framework to
guide their efforts. This bureaucratic imperative likely explains
why these efforts often appear to repeat mistakes of the past,
seemingly immune to a long tradition of insightful academic
critique. As a matter of bureaucratic practice, if not of logic, it may
therefore take at least a framework to beat a theory, and in that
spirit, this Article offers a framework for understanding law and
economic development that builds upon the Northeast Asian
experience.
This proposed approach is novel because it incorporates
explicitly the functioning of law and legal institutions during the
Northeast Asian "miracle" era. More importantly, however, the
approach offered here abandons the central assumption of all the
orthodoxies it seeks to replace, which is that legal rules and
institutions have clearly defined functions, and that the role of law
and development efforts is to get client countries to adopt specific
legal reforms that will reliably produce intended social outcomes.
Instead of drawing on Northeast Asia to create yet another set of
law and development prescriptions for implementation by
developing countries, the Northeast Asian experience will be used
here as evidence that the proper role of law and development
assistance is both more modest and more demanding. More
modest because it involves the admission of uncertainty and
competing goals in the functioning of legal rules and institutions,
yet more demanding in that it recognizes the top-down, formalist
logic of existing orthodoxies is insufficient, and must be replaced
by continued monitoring, learning-by-doing, and re-examination
of both means and ends.
Insistence upon the importance of Northeast Asia for
understanding law and development is premised, first of all, upon
a methodological choice in favor of empirical analysis, not to the
2007]
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exclusion of other types of analysis, but as indispensable
nonetheless. Even if one defines development in purely economic
terms, law and legality make up only a small part of the broader
social matrix that will be relevant to how any economy performs.
This broader matrix includes non-legal factors such as education
levels, demographics, natural resource endowments, geographical
location, technology levels, domestic political institutions, social
and cultural norms and practices, and international politics and
economics. A country's policy choices with respect to these factors
will often be reflected in positive law, of course, so social or
economic reforms almost invariably involve legal change. Law
and development activities aim for something more ambitious,
however, and seek to put the functioning of legal systems at the
center of the development equation. Because so many non-legal
factors are clearly relevant to a country's economic performance,
however, and because these factors, like legal system performance,
tend to be difficult to isolate, quantify, and study scientifically, the
best we can probably hope for in constructing law and
development theory will help structure and guide inquiry, but will
not constitute hard science.
The conviction behind this Article is that the best way to
generate such "soft" theory is to do so inductively, studying recent
examples of both economic success and economic failure, and then
trying to draw defensible inferences based upon what can be
observed about the functioning of law in these episodes.15 While
studying failures can no doubt be instructive for understanding
law and development, studying only a country that has a weak
legal system and a weak economy, such as Russia in the early to
mid-1990s, encourages the confusion of correlation with causation.
In law and development studies this would mean blaming a lack of
economic development on a weak legal system, when in fact
causation might run the other way. Moreover, studying from the
15 For an application of this approach to the task of developing theory about
economic development more generally, see ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF "THE
REST": CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM LATE-INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES 290 (2001)
("Models that are inductive use concrete cases of industrial expansion rather than
abstract hypotheses to explain growth and guide policy making."). Economist
Dani Rodrik has applied a similar approach in his work on the role of government
in East Asian development. Dani Rodrik, Getting Interventions Right: How South
Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 4964,
1994). For an insightful example from the era of modernization theory, see
Alexander Gerschenkron, The Modernization of Entrepreneurship, in
MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF GROwTH 246 (Myron Weiner ed., 1966).
[Vol. 28:2
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beginning those countries that developed most successfully (i.e.,
those in Northeast Asia), should help prevent a repeat of Max
Weber's notorious England problem. Weber's "England problem"
was the inconvenient fact that England, the birthplace of modern
capitalism, had a legal system that did not really fit the formal-
rational ideal type that Weber thought was so important to modem
capitalism.16 Today's law and development orthodoxies tend to
replace Weber's Germanic bias with an Anglo-American bias, but
run the risk of replicating his basic mistake if they do not deal
explicitly with Northeast Asia. 17 Moreover, even theories that are
not developed inductively ought to be tested empirically, and
given the vast scholarship on Northeast Asia's economic success,
the region is well-suited to that task.
If this inductive, empirical approach is indeed an appropriate
way to generate and test theory about law and development, there
are several factors that make Northeast Asia an especially
appropriate region to which it could be applied. First and
foremost is "the miracle," the fact that Japan, then later South
Korea and Taiwan, are the premier development success stories of
the twentieth century.18 Japan's economy is now the world's
16 On Weber's "England Problem," see David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law
and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 720 (analyzing the ways in which
Weber attempted to overcome the "England Problem:" how capitalism emerged
in England when it did not possess a formal legal system).
17 Some scholars are beginning to note that China is experiencing rapid
economic growth without the kind of legal system that law and development
orthodoxies posit as necessary, but much of what they are noticing now about
China has been true for decades in China's neighbors. See generally Clarke et al.,
supra note 13 (examining the role of law in China's economic development).
18 See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1993) (discussing the rapid growth in East Asia and the relationship
between the public and private sector). Japan's success came earliest, beginning
in the decades around the turn of the 20th century, when Japan was transformed
from a relatively isolated, largely agricultural economy into an industrial power
capable of challenging Western military power in Asia, and of striking fear into
Western manufacturers. After its industrial base was devastated in World War II,
Japan experienced a second "miracle" during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, as its
economy quickly returned to its pre-War levels, then maintained growth rates
that made Japan one of the world's richest societies by the 1980s. Taiwan and
South Korea experienced the dark side of Japan's initial economic development,
as they both were colonized by Japan and remained under Japanese rule until
1945. Although some see this period of Japanese colonial rule as not entirely
negative with respect to post-independence economic development, the Korean
and Taiwanese "miracles" are normally seen as beginning around 1960, and
lasting until some time in the 1980s. An important strain of economics
scholarship criticizes the "miracle" label on the ground that all, or nearly all, of
20071
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second largest, behind only the United States, while Taiwan
currently stands in seventh, and South Korea at eleventh. Beyond
overall growth figures, there are several other factors that one can
point to as evidence of a development miracle in Northeast Asia.
With respect to technology, for example, within the space of a few
decades Japan, and later Taiwan and South Korea, moved from
technological backwardness to world frontiers in many fields.19 In
the 1950s, South Korea was one of the world's poorest countries,
considered a basket case by Western observers, 20 but by the 1970s
its scientific and engineering expertise allowed it credibly to
threaten an atomic weapons program.21 Today Korean scientists
are at the forefront of stem cell research,22 while Korean
manufacturers such as Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Motors, and
Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO) are internationally
Northeast Asia's economic growth can be explained using normal tools of
economic analysis. See Alwyn Young, The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the
Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience, 110 Q.J. ECON. 641 (1995);
Paul Krugman, The Myth of Asia's Miracle, 73 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 62 (1994)
(cautioning against the popular enthusiasm surrounding Asia's economic boom).
While this may be true, it begs the comparative question of why Northeast Asian
economies were able to do what so many others could not.
19 See Albert G. Z. Hu & Adam B. Jaffe, Patent Citations and International
Knowledge Flow: The Cases of Korea and Taiwan 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8528, 2001) ("Korea and Taiwan are two of the newly
industrializing economies that have achieved tremendous technological progress
and economic growth. Both have graduated from imitation to innovation within
a single generation, by building their indigenous technological capabilities and
moving up the technology ladder.").
20 See William Easterly, Explaining Miracles: Growth Regressions Meet the Gang
of Four 12 (World Bank, Policy Research Paper No. 1250, 1994) ("The first World
Bank mission to Korea in the early 1960s described the development as
ludicrously optimistic .... ).
21 See Young-sun Ha, Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: The Case of
Korea, 18 ASIAN SURV. 1134, 1138 (1978) (explaining that since South Korea was
able to produce fissile materials in the 1970s, it also had the basic knowledge
required for nuclear technology). By the 1970s Taiwan, too, had the technological
capability to mount a nuclear weapons program. See DENNY Roy, TAIWAN: A
POLITICAL HISTORY 143-44 (2003) (recounting the International Atomic Energy
Agency's discovery of Taiwan's clandestine nuclear weapons program).
22 As of June 2005, South Korea had published 29 human embryonic stem cell
lines, second only to the 46 published by the United States. Richard Gardner &
Tim Watson, A Patchwork of Laws, in THE FUTURE OF STEM CELLS, FINANCIAL TIMES
AND SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN SPECIAL REPORT, at A16, A21 (Lionel Barber & John
Rennie eds., 2005).
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preeminent in their fields.23 Taiwan's science and technology are
also at world frontiers in many fields, particularly semiconductors
and personal computers.24 Social indicators also show remarkable
progress, as health care, life spans, education levels, and diet all
showed remarkable improvement. 25 One of the most striking
aspects of these achievements is that they have been shared
comparatively equally, so that Northeast Asian societies do not
display the vast disparities between rich and poor that often
accompany rapid economic expansions.
26
In addition, although observers often focus on the similarities
among Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, as successful
"developmental states," 27 for example, there is also a great deal of
diversity among the three countries in areas that likely matter for
development. Post-War Japan has been a democracy, for example,
while Taiwan and Korea were both authoritarian for large parts of
their high-growth periods. Despite the fact that Taiwan and Korea
were both colonies of Japan, as a result of differing colonial
policies 28 and other historical factors, 29 their post-WWII histories
23 See Tae-gyu Kim, 'Republic of Samsung' Builds up in Korea, KOREA TIMES,
May 17, 2005; B. J. Lee, Rolling in the Dough, NEWSWEEK (INT'L EDITION), May 23,
2005, at 40.
24 See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin & Steve Lohr, I.B.M. Said to Put Its PC
Business on the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at Al (reporting on I.B.M.'s
decision to put up for sale its personal computing division).
25 See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE, supra note 18, at fig. 3
(displaying graphically the dramatic improvements in human welfare in Asian
countries from 1965 to 1990).
26 See id. at 49 ("Economic growth is like a handicapped race; the returns to
equal effort at accumulation are greater for the poor economy. If the rates of
accumulation of all economies, rich and poor, are roughly similar, neoclassical
growth models predict that poor economies will eventually catch up to the
leaders.").
27 See, e.g., ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990) (attributing the
success of developing East Asian countries to the synergy between free markets
and government administration).
28 Japan's political policies towards Korea were harsher and more ambitious
than those towards Taiwan, at times calling for Korea to be incorporated into
Japan proper, and for Korean culture to be essentially eradicated. Taiwan, by
contrast, was treated much more like a "normal" colony. Japan's economic
policies towards the two colonies differed as well, with Taiwan remaining a
largely unindustrialized exporter of agricultural products to Japan, while Korea,
particularly the northern regions, became fairly heavy industrialized.
29 Taiwan ended up being ruled by the Nationalist government that had
substantial experience in China prior to fleeing to Taiwan in the late 1940s, as it
was losing the Chinese civil war to Mao Zedong and the communists. Korea, in
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have differed substantially. Important differences can be seen with
respect to foreign investment30 and state ownership of industry,
31
and in patterns of private ownership of industry32 and defense
expenditures. 33  While recognizing that overemphasizing
similarities among Asian societies can be evidence of some
unfortunate "isms,"34 the pattern of broad similarities with
relatively discrete differences which Northeast Asia offers should
facilitate empirically-based theorizing that will be more convincing
than what could be done with a sample of countries which had
little in common.
35
contrast, was under United States military rule until 1948, after which formal
authority was turned over to a newly established political system dominated by
United States prot~g~e Syngman Rhee, who won the first presidential election.
30 Policies toward foreign investment have varied among the three countries,
as have levels. Historically, foreign direct investment played a greater role in
Taiwan than in Korea or Japan, however the Asian Financial Crisis and Japan's
sustained economic slump have lead to changes in those economies that have
resulted in higher levels of foreign investment. Comparative statistics on foreign
direct investment (FDI) are available on the Country Fact Sheets website of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemD=2441&lang=1 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2007).
31 Japan's economy was characterized by little direct state ownership, while
the level in Korea was higher, and the level in Taiwan was higher yet. For a
discussion of the differences between Taiwan and Korea, see Alice H. Amsden,
Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: The Origins of Small Enterprise and
Regionally Decentralized Industry (Respectively), 19 WORLD DEV. 1121 (1991). Note
that some see the attempt to define public and private realms in the
developmental state as an attempt to impose a construct that is not fully
applicable. See generally Lee, supra note 23 (concerning government control over
finance in South Korea).
32 Most of the large private firms in Korea and Taiwan have been family
controlled, while this has not been the case in Japan. Stijn Claessens et al., Who
Controls East Asian Corporations? 30 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
2054, 1999).
33 Not surprisingly, Korea has the highest per capita defense spending of the
three.
34 These include orientalism, essentialism, and racism, to name a few.
35 Several scholars have examined specific differences in Northeast Asia
against their relatively common background conditions. See RICHARD WHITLEY,
BusINEss SYSTEMS IN EAST ASIA (1992) (comparing business structures in Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong); Gary G. Hamilton & Nicole Woolsey Biggart,
Market, Culture, and Authority: A Comparative Analysis of Management and
Organization in the Far East, 94 AM. J. Soc. S52 (Supp. 1988) (examining different
outcomes with respect to enterprise organization, despite relatively similar
background conditions); John K.M. Ohnesorge, States, Industrial Policies &
Antidumping Enforcement in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L. L. 289
(1997) (comparing antidumping practices in Japan, Korea and Taiwan); Hun Joo
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This Article seeks to construct such theory by demonstrating
the following: the success of Northeast Asia, in spite of its failure
to conform to law and development theories from the 1960s to the
present, requires an in-depth reassessment of the framework used
by IFIs, scholars, and policy makers to formulate law and
development policy. Section 2 chronicles the key orthodoxies that
have informed law and development efforts from the 1960s to
today, and Section 3 then demonstrates that in important ways
none of them can be reconciled with the Northeast Asian law and
development experience. This lays the groundwork for Section 4,
which draws upon the Northeast Asian experience, but does so in
order to inform a new approach to law and development, not as
the basis for yet another orthodoxy to be imposed upon
developing countries.
2. THE ORTHODOXIES OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
Looking at the history of law and development thinking,
particularly in the United States, one can identify two quite distinct
dominant orthodoxies 36 which prevailed in the 1960s and the
1990s, respectively. To those two orthodoxies must now be added
two current "proto-orthodoxies," which at the present time can be
seen as contending for dominance.37 This Section chronicles the
development of these orthodoxies and proto-orthodoxies.
Discussions of law and development orthodoxies typically
begin with what Trubek and Galanter dubbed "liberal legality,"
the approach associated with modernization theory of the 1950s
Park, Small Business in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan: Dirigiste Coalition Politics and
Financial Policies Compared, 41 ASIAN SURV. 846 (2001) (comparing different policies
towards small and medium enterprises).
36 Although it might be useful to think of these orthodoxies as paradigms in
the Kuhnian sense, use of that term seems to demand a type of internal,
psychological analysis that will not be attempted here. I am not privy to whether
people and institutions who advocate particular law and development
orthodoxies do so as a result of operating within a Kuhnian paradigm which
constrains and structures the ways that they conceive the issues and the universe
of possible responses, but for purposes of this exercise it may not matter.
Furthermore, unlike the natural sciences, for which Kuhn developed his ideas,
law and development initiatives are so rarely connected with a research agenda,
as opposed to an active, political agenda, that it seems better to analyze these
activities in more traditional political action terms.
37 Similar periodizations are employed by contributors to TRUBEK & SANTOS,
supra note 3.
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and 1960s. 38 That orthodoxy was largely spent by the early 1970s,
as the broader modernization ethos succumbed to realities such as
the Vietnam War and the extent to which "modern" Western
societies did not themselves fit the model, and as funding for law
and development activities dried up.39  The critics of
modernization theory did not succeed in providing an alternative
law and development orthodoxy, but they did produce two
influential bodies of work-dependency theory and the world
systems approach -which will also be discussed here. The second
commonly recognized era of law and development began around
1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of
the Soviet Union. Much had changed in the economics academy
since the 1970s, and the new law and development orthodoxy that
developed was a neoliberal rule of law orthodoxy associated with
what has been termed the "Washington Consensus." 40 While this
intellectual history is generally accepted, this Article argues that a
complete picture must now include two more recent proto-
orthodoxies, which are quite distinctive, and which might be seen
as contending for dominance. One of these, termed here the
"comprehensive development rule of law," can be associated with
trends within the World Bank under President James
Wolfensohn,41 while the other, termed here the "legal origins"
38 See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WLs.
L. REV. 1062, 1070 ("In the early years of the law and development movement
many scholars and assistance officials shared a tacit set of assumptions about the
relationship between law and development.... [Tjhe basic presuppositions of this
paradigm ... we shall call 'liberal legalism .... "). A useful recent introduction
to modernization theory is NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE:
MODERNIZATION THEORY IN COLD WAR AMERICA (2003).
39 See GILMAN, supra note 38.
40 John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and the
Developmental States of Northeast Asia, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA 91 (Christoph Antons ed., 2003) (examining the application of
rule of law rhetoric in the study of Northeast Asian economies). On the origins of
the "Washington consensus" concept, see John Williamson, From Reform Agenda to
Damaged Brand Name: A Short History of the Washington Consensus and Suggestions
for Mhat to Do Next, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2003, at 10.
41 See Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation
Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, in Trubek & Santos, supra note 3, at 203
(discussing various World Bank trends and related reform); see also John K.M.
Ohnesorge, On Rule of Law Rhetoric, Economic Development, and Northeast Asia 7
(Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1026,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=918122 (describing President
Wolfenson's proposed legal reforms in 1999).
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approach, has its origins in the writings of financial economists
originally interested in legal systems and financial system
performance. 42 As will be developed in Section 3, below, this
Article is inspired by the conviction that none of these orthodoxies
fares well when examined in light of the Northeast Asian
experience of law and economic development.
2.1. Law and Development in the Era of Modernization
The modernization orthodoxy saw its heyday in the 1950s and
1960s, but as will be seen, some of its core assumptions remain
influential. Certainly the best chronicled orthodoxy in law and
development, the modernization orthodoxy was not concerned
only with economic development, but saw development as a
process by which "traditional" or "backwards" societies would
transform along a host of dimensions to become "modern."
Scholars from a range of disciplines shared the modernization
ethos - indeed interdisciplinarity was fundamental to the goal of
developing a total theory of society43 - so they naturally produced
traditional-modern schemas based upon their disciplinary
concerns. The following schema, produced by Harvard social
psychologist Alex Inkeles, nicely captures the ethos as it lays out
the factors said to characterize "modern man":
(1) openness to new experience, both with people
and with new ways of doing things such as
attempting to control births;
(2) the assertion of increasing independence from
the authority of traditional figures like parents
and priests and a shift of allegiance to leaders of
government, public affairs, trade unions,
cooperatives, and the like;
(3) belief in the efficacy of science and medicine,
42 See John K.M. Ohnesorge, China's Economic Transition and the New Legal
Origins Literature, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 485 (2003) (discussing the literature of the
"legal origins" approach). This literature is also referred to as the "law and
finance" literature, and sometimes as the "law matters" literature.
43 See GILMAN, supra note 38, at 77-79 (discussing interdisciplinary aspects of
modernization initiatives at Harvard, Yale, and Chicago, and tracing
interdisciplinary focus to Talcott Parson's search for a unified theory of social
action in which the role of neoclassical economics would be limited).
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and a general abandonment of passivity and
fatalism in the face of life's difficulties; and
(4) ambition for oneself and one's children to
achieve high occupational and educational
goals.
Men who manifest these characteristics:
(5) like people to be on time and show an interest in
carefully planning their affairs in advance;...
(6) show strong interest and take an active part in
civic and community affairs and local politics;
and
(7) strive energetically to keep up with the news,
and within this effort to prefer news of national
and international import over items dealing
with sports, religion, or purely local affairs. 44
This type of schema was central to modernization research,
sometimes, as here, leaving the "traditional" side of the equation
unspecified, but often including both.45 Modernization scholars
clearly believed that it was possible to identify objectively valid
characteristics of "modernity" in constructs like this, but in
retrospect modern man looks less like a scientifically useful general
type than like the self-image of a liberal Harvard professor. One
suspects that if modern man had ventured from Harvard Square
into Somerville or East Cambridge he might have realized that he
did not need to fly to India to collect data on "traditional man,"
who likes reading the sports section, listens to his priest (at least
some of the time), and is not always punctual or involved in local
politics. Falling into the same unfortunate dynamic, "modern
society" came to resemble nothing so much as liberal intellectual
America's vision of itself, a social welfare state characterized by a
44 Alex Inkeles, Making Men Modern: On the Causes and Consequences of
Individual Change in Six Developing Countries, 75 AM. J. Soc. 208, 210 (1969).
45 Perhaps the most influential of these schemas, Talcott Parsons's "pattern
variables" included both sides in the variables, said to capture the dynamics of all
societies. For another effort by Parsons along the same lines, see Talcott Parsons,
Evolutionary Universals in Society, 29 AM. Soc. REV. 339 (1964).
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homogeneous, secular political culture, pluralist democratic
politics, industrialization, urbanization, occupational
specialization, high social mobility, and the nuclear family, among
other aspects.
46
The specifically legal dimension of the modernization ethos
shared important elements of the general approach. Law reform
was not simply about economic development, it was about helping
Third World countries develop "modem" legal systems. 47 A
modern legal system, like a modern society for modernization
theorists more generally, was supposed to be the ultimate stage in
a more or less universal process of societal evolution, but at the
same time bore a striking resemblance to an idealized vision of the
contemporary United States legal system.48  And again, like
modernization theory more generally, the idealized picture
reflected the normative commitments of America's moderate,
liberal elite, who at that time could claim to represent an
ideological consensus in a way that seems fantastic now.49 In
addition, the elements of "liberal legality" were distinct yet
mutually reinforcing, so that one could have faith that assisting in
the modernization of one institution or body of law would have
salutary "spillover effects" on the whole system.50 For example,
one might believe in the priority of economic growth over other
aspects of development, as some modernization scholars did, but
46 See GILMAN, supra note 38 (analyzing theories advanced by scholars who
focused on various attributes of the modernization theory).
47 See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 38, at 1073-74 (discussing the goal of
modernizing legal systems as a means of fostering social development).
48 See id. at 1079-80 (discussing the assumption that "any activity that was
designed to change legal institutions of Third World countries to make them more
like those of the United States would be an effective and morally worthy
pursuit.").
49 Even if real at the time, that consensus papered over disagreements that
had existed before, and have since resurfaced to dominate American politics. For
example, the American political right's current project of enlisting fundamentalist
Christians and Catholics, on religious grounds, against the federal judiciary
represents the sort of ideological warfare that should have been long discarded in
the legal culture of a "modem" society, though of course it would have been
perfectly understandable to -the left of the New Deal and prior generations.
Likewise, the recent revival of the old battle against teaching evolution in the
public schools, certainly best explained as a result of people's religious beliefs,
suggests that the post-ideology "modernization" consensus was exceptional,
rather than a final, higher stage of social evolution.
50 On "spill-over" arguments and the neoliberal rule of law, see Ohnesorge,
supra note 41, at 4.
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even if one did not, one could still assist in economic law reform
with confidence that the "seamless web" nature of the legal system
would result in better performance on non-economic dimensions
as well.51
What were the specific elements of this idealized "modern"
legal system circa the 1960s? In terms of its overall function, law
was to be the instrument by which reformist Third World
governments would bring about social change in the direction of
socially responsible capitalism and pluralist democracy.5 2 This
view entailed both a faith that Third World states were committed
to the public interest, and a faith that law could be made "potent"
and predictable enough to serve this social engineering function.5 3
Beyond the image of law itself, the actual emphasis of law and
development efforts was very much on legal education. This
included an assumption that increasing the number of lawyers in a
society marked progress towards the rule of law, a debatable
notion that still persists in the field.54 As David Trubek has argued
recently, the modern, instrumental conception of law seemed to
require an attack on four distinct manifestations of legal formalism:
formalism in judicial reasoning, formalism in law making,
formalism in the way legal professions understood the function of
the lawyer, and importantly, formalism in the way law was
taught 5
In addition to programs to introduce specific statutory or
institutional changes, therefore, reforming legal education became
an important fulcrum for gaining leverage to reorient entire legal
cultures, and one does not really have to read between the lines to
see that the goal was Americanization. 56 Americanizing legal
51 See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 38, at 1075 (discussing the view "that a
strengthened legal profession would foster development.").
52 Id. at 1063.
53 Id.
54 Email from Professor William P. Alford, Harvard Law School (Aug. 23,
2005) (on file with author).
55 David M. Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past, Present,
and Future, in TRUBEK & SANTOS, supra note 3, at 74, 76 (describing the
shortcomings of legal education in Latin America).
56 In the words of USAID General Counsel Thomas Farmer in 1966, "[T]he
explanation [for the woeful performance of developing country lawyers] seems to
lie first of all in the nature of their legal education - a system generally based on
foreign models more responsive to conditions in Europe than to the distinctive
needs of the developing societies." Thomas L. Farmer, General Counsel, Agency
for Int'l Dev., U.S. Dep't of State, Address Before the Council of the Section of Int'l
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education would help cure Third World lawyers of their penchant
for formalism, turning them from Weberian automatons into
pragmatic problem solvers. Quoting USAID's General Counsel
Thomas Farmer,
[Elven more important [than flawed legal education] is the
lawyer's preoccupation with formal rules rather than with
creative problem-solving -whether the problems are those
of a government trying to implement a new development
program or those of private clients (local or foreign), trying
to conduct business in a society experiencing the many
stresses and strains besetting the developing countries.57
Freeing Third World lawyers from their formalist fetters would
allow a crucial expansion of their social roles, both in government
service and inoprivate practice, and it is clear in hindsight how this
role was based on the image of the elite American business lawyer,
moving easily between government service and high-level
corporate practice:
The role of the lawyer in most developing countries is on
the whole a very narrow one indeed. Both in government
and private work, the lawyer is usually considered a
technician and generally appears prepared to accept
restriction to a technician's role. The government lawyer
rarely participates in the policy making process and
frequently even cedes the task of legislative drafting to
government administrators. The private lawyers rarely acts
[sic] as a general business advisor and generally does not
participate significantly in negotiation on behalf of his
client.58
The Americanism of this emphasis is made apparent by the
reaction of a German-trained IMF lawyer of the time, who argued
that there was no real reason to think that it was their doctrinal
legal training that was keeping Third World lawyers excluded
from policy making process, while foreign lawyers were allowed
and Comparative Law, American Bar Association (August 7, 1966), in 112 CONG.
REC. 19, 25449-50 (1966) (quoted in Ballmann, infra note 59, at 201).
57 Id.
58 Id.
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in.59 The problem was more the other way around: until Third
World governments brought local lawyers into the policy making
process, for which he thought many were already ready, those
lawyers would never develop the practical skills that would allow
them to contribute meaningfully to that process.60 The idea that
"Americanizing" legal education would solve this problem was
misguided, as
No law school would attempt to teach its students how to
draft central banking, commercial banking or exchange
control legislation. This kind of specialization will have to
develop as part of a lawyer's future professional career in
government service, and it can only develop if the lawyer is
given a chance to acquire an intimate knowledge of the
policy considerations which determine the substance of the
law.
6 1
Development assistance was predominantly bilateral during
the modernization era, rather than flowing through international
organizations such as the United Nations or the international
financial institutions,62 a happy coincidence considering the
society-wide scope of the modernization approach. While
advocating economic law reforms is inherently political,
attempting to "modernize" entire societies seems obviously more
so. But attempts have been made to limit political interference by
international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the
59 See Franz Ballmann, Legal Technical Assistance of the International Monetary
Fund to Member Countries Through Economic Development Legislation, 3 J.L. & EcoN.
DEV. 197, 202 (1968) ("[Tlhere is probably less of a problem with legal education
because universities can only provide a thorough foundation in law and
economics in more general terms.").
60 See id. (arguing that the expertise of local lawyers is essential to
policymaking in developing countries).
61 Id.
62 Trubek, supra note 55, at 75. The International Monetary Fund was
involved in legal technical assistance by the late 1960s, however, though at that
point the IMF was less demanding of its borrowers. See Ballmann, supra note 59
(discussing the assistance provided by the IMF at the time). As for the choice
between the United Nations and institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF,
some suggest that developed countries shifted the development agenda away
from the UN and to the IFIs because they were easier to influence. See John Toye,
Changing Perspectives in Development Economics, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMics 21, 32 (Ha-Joon Chang ed., 2003) (discussing development assistance
as related to international financial institutions).
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Asian Development Bank,63 and although such textual constraints
are open to interpretation,64 it is clear that their presence at least
shapes the law and development rhetoric of the IFIs.65 But despite
the fact that the bilateral nature of the law and development
programs meant no international law limits on potential political
implications, the Cold War context provided recipient
governments with at least a partial shield against unwelcome
political interference, turning to the Soviets. 66 With the collapse of
the socialist world, developing countries have no way to "enforce"
the non-political interference norm, and this fact, together with the
rise of new institutional economics, meant that even the IFIs no
longer had to take the norm very seriously.
67
2.2. Dependency and World Systems Theory: Modernization's
Discontents
The decline of the modernization ethos is a complex story that
played out differently in various locations and in various academic
fields, 68 but one key area of dissatisfaction with the approach had
to do with its tendency to trust in the Third World state as
representing the public interest, defined as socially responsible
economic development and pluralist democratic governance.
69
Looking at the issue this way highlights an important parallelism
between attacks on modernization theory from the left and the
right, which also links them both to contemporaneous
developments in the United States. By the 1970s, neoclassical
economists interested in development issues were developing their
attack on state intervention as inefficient and an excuse for rent-
63 See infra notes 118-19.
64 Id.
65 The IMF was clearly aware of this issue, at least in the 1960s. See Ballmann,
supra note 59, at 198 ("The aim is always to achieve technical professional quality
as opposed to a certain political result.... [P]olitical considerations are... the
domain of the government; they are not the concern of the experts.").
66 For many modernization theorists, the Soviet Union did in fact constitute a
modem society, as it appeared to be highly industrialized and urbanized, with a
government that had succeeded in penetrating the society to mobilize the
populace. See GILMAN, supra note 38, at 148-49.
67 See infra notes 118-19.
68 See GILMAN, supra note 38, at 203-40.
69 See Henry J. Steiner & David M. Trubek, Brazil -All Power to the Generals,
49 FOREIGN AFF. 464 (1970) (providing an example from the field of law and
development).
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seeking by government functionaries. 70 This movement had direct
links to the economic attack on regulation being developed by
conservative, free-market economists in the United States, 71 which
helped spark a revolution in American public law.72 From the left,
meanwhile, came the charge that the Third World state was
captured by international capital and in league with local
comprador elites, 73  a charge that shares much with the
contemporaneous claims from the American left that United States
regulatory agencies were captured by the industries they were
supposed to be regulating in the public interest.74 The neoclassical
attack will be discussed in connection with the rise of the
neoliberal ("Washington Consensus") rule of law, Section 2.3,
below, while the following passages address attacks on
modernization thinking from the left, which came in the form of
dependency theory and world systems analysis.75
Dependency theory is typically associated with economists
Raul Prebisch, Andre Gunder Frank,76 and their followers, while
world systems analysis is associated with the historian Emmanuel
70 See, e.g., Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,
AM. ECON. REV., Jun. 1974, at 291, 291-94 (examining the effects of government
restrictions on rent-seeking).
7 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI., Spring 1971, 3, at 10-13 (critiquing government regulation of
industry).
72 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039-44 (1997) (describing a sixteen year period of
remarkable common-lawmaking during which the federal courts "significantly
transformed the law of administrative procedure").
73 See Toye, supra note 62, at 30-31 (reviewing the rise of neoliberalism).
74 See Merrill, supra note 72 (finding that the bias of agencies towards the
industries they regulate is regarded as a pervasive problem).
75 See J. Samuel Valenzuela & Arturo Valenzuela, Modernization and
Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment,
10 COMP. POL. 535 (1978) (comparing and contrasting the "dependency" and
"modernization" perspectives). It is useful in this context to remember here that
the "developmental state" scholarship that grew out of studies of Northeast Asia
in the late 1970s was a reaction to the fact that in their attacks on modernization
theory and the Third World state neither the right nor the left paid much attention
to the role of the state in Northeast Asia. See, e.g., Amsden, supra note 31
(suggesting that the historical roots of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) and regional decentralization of industry make the policies of Taiwan's
economic development difficult to reproduce elsewhere).
76 See, e.g., Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment,
MONTHLY REVIEW, Sept. 1966, at 17; Andre Gunder Frank, The Sociology of
Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology, CATALYST, Summer 1967, at 20.
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Wallerstein.77 Though there are important differences between the
dependency and world systems approaches, the two can be said to
share the following basic views. First, both assign nations of the
world to categories such as "core/periphery," "center/periphery,"
or "dominant/dependent," based upon their wealth and power.
The core is made up of advanced industrialized nations, the
periphery is made up of poor states which often rely on
commodity exports for their foreign exchange earnings, while the
"semi-periphery" is somewhere in between. This international
division of labor, the "international system," favors some countries
to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities
of the subordinate economies. This ultimately results in "a
situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is
conditioned by the development and expansion of another
economy, to which their own is subjected."7
8
The modernization approach had seen integration into the
international economic order as basically benign and desirable,
though its focus on state-supported industrialization certainly
reflected doubt that Ricardian comparative advantage alone would
enrich developing countries. While this doubt was in the air in the
1940S,79 it became formalized around 1950 in the Prebisch-Singer
thesis, which holds that the terms of trade favor manufacturing
over commodities in the long term, so that for a developing
country to simply rely on its comparative advantage to export
commodities, while importing manufactured goods, would be a
losing proposition. 80 But while modernization theory counted on
the nation state to play the necessary, interventionist role of
fostering industrialization, the dependency theories that followed
doubted that the international forces which consign nations to the
"periphery" will allow Third World states to play such a
constructive role. These forces, which include international
commodity markets, the interests of multinational corporations, as
77 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist
System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis, 16 COMP. STUD. Soc'Y & HIST. 387 (1974)
(describing world systems analysis).
78 Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, in READINGS IN U.S.
IMPERIALISM 225 (K.T. Fann & Donald C. Hodges eds., 1971).
79 John Toye & Richard Toye, The Origins and Interpretation of the Prebisch-
Singer Thesis, 35 HIST. POL. ECON. 437, 440 (2003) ("By the time of World War II, the
belief had already begun to gain ground that agricultural countries had better
reasons than industrial ones to be pessimistic about their economic prospects.").
80 Id. at 437-38.
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well as the interests of Third World comprador elites, will instead
conspire to maintain and enforce the international division of labor
captured in the core-periphery image. According to Andre Frank,
the relationship between the satellite underdeveloped countries
and the now developed metropolitan countries is an essential part
of the capitalist system.
If one understands the problem in this way, there is little sense
in modernization's strategy of replicating within developing
countries the institutions of "modern" societies since
modernization was never based on internal characteristics but was
instead achieved through the exploitation of poor countries.
Focusing, 2 la Weber, Parsons, and their followers,81 on the internal
characteristics of developing countries to explain why they are
poor is just a form of blaming the victim, and even if a developing
country succeeded in replicating modern institutions internally,
this would do nothing to change the country's place in the
international order.
While there clearly was an orthodoxy of law and development
that corresponded to modernization theory, it is not surprising that
no such orthodoxy can be linked to dependency and world
systems thinking, which arose in critical reaction to modernization
theory, and to the Western exploitation of the developing world
with which modernization theory was tainted. Dependency and
world system thinking, as facets of a broader collapse of
modernization thinking, clearly affected those involved in law and
development activities.82 However, the message these approaches
would impart would be a deep skepticism towards legal
development assistance targeted at domestic legal systems. Some
in the law and development community influenced by the
dependency critique retained an interest in law reform, but turned
their attention from national law reforms to reforming the
international legal order, a movement associated with the New
81 The institutional approach of Douglass North, for example, would be open
to the same critique. See infra notes 84, 86, 239, 250, 251 and accompanying text.
82 See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 38, at 1063 ("Many scholars in the area
have encountered difficulties defining the nature of their work or explaining its
social utility."); see also JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS
AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980); Francis G. Snyder, Law and Development
in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 723 (1980) (discussing the
methods, presuppositions and concepts of the principle theoretical writings on
underdevelopment and dependency).
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International Economic Order movement of the 1970s.83 It was in
this way that some law reform advocates maintained a link with
development economics as some in that field also turned their
attention to reforming the international economic system.
2.3. The Washington Consensus Rule of Law
The next real orthodoxy that arose following the demise of the
modernization movement was the rule of law orthodoxy
associated with the Washington Consensus and the energetic
neoliberalism of the 1990s. This was the orthodoxy developed to
frame and justify the massive law and development agenda that
grew out of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and which
accompanied the economic globalization of the 1990s. References
to economist Douglass North's designation of law as an
"institution" with important economic implications 84 helped justify
legal reform initiatives that went far beyond the scope of prior IFI
initiatives, and the rule of law became the umbrella concept used
to rhetorically unify a wide range of legal development
initiatives.85
While economic thinking about development generally had
moved on after the demise of modernization, much of it towards
free-market solutions, some in the direction of the dependency
critique, it was some time before a new law and development
orthodoxy arose. This was likely the result of several factors, but
among them two seem especially important. First, one would have
to count the tendency, prior to the rise of "new institutional
economics," ("NIE") for mainstream economics not to think much
about private law, essentially assuming smoothly functioning legal
systems as the background for theorizing about markets.8 6 As
83 Scott Newton, The Dialectics of Law and Development, in Trubek & Santos,
supra note 3, at 174, 182-87 (discussing the "Commonwealth school" that arose,
informed by dependency theory, in reaction to the modemization orthodoxy).
84 See DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990) (providing an analysis of the nature and role of institutions
which has become widely cited in law and development literature).
85 See Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy, supra note 13, at 1
("The new development model contends that sustainable growth is impossible
without the existence of the rule of law: a set of uniformly enforced, established
legal regimes that clearly lays out the rules of the game."); Ohnesorge, supra note
41, at 1 ("The 1990s saw a remarkable revival of the term 'Rule of Law' in legal
and political discourse in the U.S., and internationally.").
86 See Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72
(1998) (describing trends in economic theory that have developed since the term
2007]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
neoclassical economics came to dominate development thinking,
attention shifted away from the "process" or "systemic" concerns
important to the modernization era, such as building modern
government institutions and ensuring that legal systems could
effectively transmit government policies, to a substantive concern
with free markets and limited government.
Two separate currents seem to have converged in the late 1980s
to bring law and legal institutions back into the development
picture. One was the increasing influence of NIE, which brings
institutional structures and processes, explicitly including law,
back into economic theorizing. The second was the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the collapse of the socialist world, which had two
effects. First, it quite suddenly presented the development
community with the problem of how to nurture market economies
in Eastern and Central Europe, the Baltics, and Central Asia, where
legal systems were geared to socialist rather than capitalist
economics, 87 and second, it left developing countries with nowhere
to turn for assistance except the U.S.-dominated West, in which
views on economics and the role of the state in society had taken a
strong turn towards the market.8
8
"new institutional economics" was coined); Douglass C. North, Institutions and
Economic Theory, 36 AM. ECONOMIST 3 (1992).
87 See Cheryl W. Gray, In Search of Owners: Privatization and Corporate
Governance in Transition Economies, WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER, Aug. 1996,
at 179, 181:
[Formerly socialist economies must] establish the institutions of a private
market economy. Socialism either crippled or reoriented these
institutions to reflect the goals of central planners. Legal frameworks
defining property rights, private contract regimes, fiduciary liability,
dispute resolution mechanisms, and rules of entry and exit for private
firms atrophied. Courts lost much, if not all, of their independence as
well as their role as adjudicators of commercial disputes and enforcers of
commercial laws. Banks lost their independent monitoring role over
firms and became instead passive funnels for channeling state funds.
"Watchdog" institutions that provide critical information for markets to
function, such as credit-rating and consumer protection services,
accounting and legal professions, and independent journalism, had
neither reason nor permission to exist. Finally, socialism inhibited
(indeed, often classified as illegal) the development of basic norms and
ethics of market conduct and fiduciary responsibility on which so much
behavior in advanced market economies implicitly rests. These laws,
organizations, professions, and commercial norms must now be rebuilt,
sometimes from scratch.
88 Countries wanting to reform within a basically socialist order might turn to
China, but China has not shown great interest in exporting its law reform
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2.3.1. The Economics of the Washington Consensus
Described very simply, NIE refers to the branch of economics
that concerns itself with the ways that economic behavior, whether
by individuals or by firms, is affected by the institutional setting in
which actors find themselves.89 The approach is sometimes traced
to Ronald Coase's 1937 article, The Nature of the Firm,90 which
argued that a firm's decision to produce an input itself, or instead
to obtain it by contracting with an outside producer, should be
understood as based upon a consideration of the "transaction
costs" involved, mainly the costs involved in creating and
enforcing the purchase contract.91 Coase's thesis was that a firm
will continue to bring production of inputs in-house until the cost
of doing so exceeds the cost of obtaining them on the market, and
because transaction costs are determined by the institutional
environment in which the firm exists, it is this institutional
environment that determines in a very real way the scope of any
particular firm. From this insight grew the field of "transaction
cost economics," associated with Oliver Williamson and others,
and the broader NIE tradition. It is important to note that NIE
shares with modernization scholarship the goal of unifying social
science under one paradigm. But while Talcott Parsons, at least,
dreamed of a unified social theory in which economics would
provide but one source of knowledge about human behavior,
92
NIE's distinctly anti-Parsonian aspiration is to unify the social
sciences under the hegemony of economics.
93
experience, and countries in Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam, tend to be
ambivalent about Chinese influence.
89 See Coase, The New Institutional Economics, supra note 86.
90 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
91 Id. at 390-92.
92 See GILMAN, supra note 38, at 79-84; Parsons, supra note 45, at 339-46
(clarifying the concept "evolutionary universal" - innovation which gives the
possessor a substantial increase in general adaptive capacity-and citing four
features of human cultural and social organization that are prerequisites for socio-
cultural development); Trubek, supra note 16, at 720-52 (distilling Max Weber's
contribution to law and development theory).
93 See Iris Center at the University of Maryland,
http://www.iris.umd.edu/Reader.aspx?TYPE=FORMALPUBLICATION&ID =
a2113878-d64a-40f1-a570-215d2a810606 (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) (reviewing A
NEW INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Mancur Olson & Satu
Kahkonen eds., 2001)) ("Modem economics has had a deep influence on thinking
in other social sciences, leading to the theoretical integration of all the social
sciences under an overarching paradigm.").
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Related to NIE is the "public choice" tradition in economics,
which applies the methods of microeconomics to the study of real,
especially political, institutions.94 Public choice sentiment was
already well represented in development economics through the
work of Ann Krueger and Jagdish Bhagwati, among others, whose
attacks in the 1970s on rent-seeking by Third World governments
constituted part of the rejection of the modernization approach.95
Although NIE and public choice might be thought of as separate
traditions, one studying the behavior of institutions, the other
studying how institutions structure individual behavior, this is not
the place to disentangle the two. People who are important to the
two traditions and to their impact on law and development, North
and Mancur Olson 96 in particular, are connected to both traditions.
In addition, one can say that both started with a strong
commitment to "methodological individualism" and rational actor
assumptions, 97 although broadening the definition of an institution
to include social and cultural norms, as both Coase and North do,98
loosens the rational actor assumption from its traditional mooring
in narrow economic terms. Second, in their prescriptive modes, at
least as absorbed by the law and development literature, they
combined to support a predictably neoliberal set of policies,
focusing on deregulation, privatization, and maximum play for the
markets. It could be said that NIE opened the door for economists
to concern themselves with pretty much any aspect of a legal
system, while the public choice approach helped convince them
that governments should not do much more with these legal
94 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (presenting five main reasons why the issues
raised by public choice are critically important); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS,
& GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997) (examining
the challenges and issues that arise under positive political theory).
95 See Toye, supra note 62, at 31 (discussing rent-seeking activities); Krueger,
supra note 70, at 291-94 (examining the adverse effects of government restrictions
on rent-seeking).
96 See A NEW INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 93 (using examples from developing countries to explore the interaction
between economics and other social sciences). Olson co-founded the University
of Maryland's IRIS Center, a major participant in United States government-
funded law and development projects which operates within the NIE rubric.
97 On NIE, see, for example, Coase, supra note 86. On public choice, see
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 94; MASHAW, supra note 94.
98 For Coase the relevant institutional matrix of a particular country includes,
"its legal system, its political system, its social system, its educational system, its
culture, and so on." Coase, supra note 86, at 73.
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systems than establish rules respecting property and contract,
along with courts to enforce them.
2.3.2. The New Law and Development of the Washington
Consensus
With NIE and public choice economics providing the
intellectual framework, the specific law and development
orthodoxy that developed during this period could be thought of
as a Washington Consensus or neoliberal rule of law.99 In accord
with NIE thinking, but also certainly responding to the demand for
systemic legal reform presented by the transitioning socialist legal
systems, the orthodoxy sought to provide the answer to legal
system needs from bottom to top.100 Private property rights were
at the center of the approach, making demands both on private and
public law to provide clear, predictable "rules of the game" within
which private economic activity could take place. On the private
law side, the orthodoxy focused on providing clear and
enforceable private property rights, and rules-based contract law
that would facilitate trade. 0 Courts and court reform become
very important in this orthodoxy, but the concern seemed to be
mainly with how to make courts "user friendly;" how to make
them effective, low-transaction-cost enforcers of private rights.
102
Legal professions reappeared, but, like courts, mainly as reducers
of the costs of transacting 0 3
Private property is also protected by criminal law, of course,
and economists demonstrated mathematically that law and order
99 See Ohnesorge, supra note 40 (questioning the rule of law-economic
rhetoric of the World Bank as it relates to development in Northeast Asia). A
thorough statement of the approach can be found in WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1996: FROM PLAN TO MARKET 85-97 (The World Bank 1996). For a concise example,
see Cheryl W. Gray, Reforming Legal Systems in Developing and Transition Countries,
FIN. & DEV., Sept. 1997, at 14, 14 ("Improving the functioning of legal institutions
is an essential component of economic development.").
100 This claim of a mandate for total reform is apparent in the statement by
the principal economist in the World Bank's Policy Research Department. Gray,
supra note 87, at 181.
101 See WORLD BANK, supra note 99, at 87 ("Where the rule of law is in force,
laws are applied fairly, transparently, and evenhandedly to all ... ").
102 See Gray, supra note 99, at 14 ("If a dense and efficient network of
commercial relationships is to flourish in an economy, it needs a credible and low-
cost formal legal process to which aggrieved parties can turn when all else fails.").
103 See WORLD BANK, supra note 99, at 93 (discussing the various roles played
by judicial institutions).
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is important to a functioning economy, though a bit of re-branding
turned "law and order" into the rule of law.104 More importantly,
though, private property is also protected by public law, and it was
here that public choice economics and the economics-based
critique of regulation made their greatest impact on the law and
development orthodoxy. In looking at references to constitutional
law in the literature of the time, the main concern seems to have
been with trying to overcome the "credible commitments" puzzle:
how to engineer constitutional law so that the same governments
that were creating and defining private property rights would not
subsequently be able to "infringe" them. 105  With respect to
administrative law, the main claim of the orthodoxy was again that
economic development required a system of administrative law
that could tightly constrain government actors within a system of
clear rules, which would facilitate freedom of action by private
economic actors, as well as reduce opportunities for rent-seeking
(which would also be reduced by deregulation). This reflected a
Hayekian commitment to maximizing the clarity and predictability
of the regulatory environment, thus maximizing the extent to
which private actors can plan their activities,10 6 as well as reflecting
the public choice position that the incentives of bureaucrats lead to
rent-seeking and bureaucratic imperialism. 107
In addition to claiming that this highly protective framework
for private property and contract enforcement was crucial for
economic development, the orthodoxy included strong claims with
respect to several specific areas of law. Broadly defined and
vigorously enforced intellectual property rights, for example, were
said to be important for economic development, as without them
locals would not invent, and foreign intellectual property owners
would not invest or make their technology available through
104 See Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance:
Cross Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207
(1995) (quantifying the relationship between institutions, economics and growth).
105 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 99-
102 (The World Bank, 1997).
106 For Hayek, the rule of law meant that "the government in all actions is
bound by rules fixed and announced before-hand- rules which make it possible
to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in
given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this
knowledge." FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM 72 (1944).
107 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANNEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971) (developing a theory of supply by bureaus).
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licensing. 08  Developing countries needed to have effective
competition law so markets would be competitive, 10 9 and effective
insolvency regimes to make sure creditors could enforce their
rights.1 0 Effective corporate law protecting shareholders was also
claimed to be important, either to protect minority from majority
shareholders,"' or to protect shareholders from managers based
upon the assumption of a separation of ownership and control.
112
It is obvious that much of this reform energy was highly
instrumental, directed not merely at "reforming" legal systems,
whatever that might mean, but at getting them to meet substantive
performance criteria along specified dimensions. The goal was not
just some general level of performance, but to achieve "a well-
functioning legal system in a market economy," which required "a
supply of market-friendly laws, adequate institutions to implement
and enforce them, and a demand for those laws from market
participants."" 3 The idea seems to have been to set in motion a
virtuous cycle, in which demand and supply would feed off one
another until the market-friendly neoliberal Rule of Law was
achieved. Demand was to be supplied via privatization in former
socialist countries such as Russia," 4 so the orthodoxy functioned as
a justification for rapid, wholesale privatization, which the
neoliberal rule of law would have rendered irreversible, had the
model worked. As will be discussed below, that goal, like the idea
of a "modern" society, tended to reproduce an idealized picture of
how law operated in the United States or perhaps Western Europe,
but was not well supported by the roles that law played in
108 See Ohnesorge, supra note 40, at 96, 103.
109 See WORLD BANK, supra note 99, at 92-93 (discussing competition laws and
barriers to trade).
110 See id. at 91-92 (analyzing an effective bankruptcy code).
1' See, e.g., Gray, supra note 99, at 15 (describing the extensive system of
shareholder protections built into the 1995 Russian company law to allow
minority shareholders to protect themselves against dominant shareholders).
112 See, e.g., Gray, supra note 87, at 2 ("For small firms this is straightforward.
•. the owners and managers are one and the same. For large firms, however, the
likely separation of ownership and management creates the need for
monitoring.").
113 See Gray, supra note 99, at 14-15.
114 See Katherine Hendley, Rewriting the Rules of the Game in Russia: The
Neglected Issue of the Demand for Law, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REV. (Fall 1999) available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol8num4/feature/rewriting.html (discussing
the attitude of citizens to Russia's recent embrace of the rule of law) (last visited
Apr. 8, 2007).
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Northeast Asia's successful market economies. Before that
discussion, however, it is important to note the wrapping in which
this gift came to the world, a highly particular rule of law rhetoric.
There are several aspects of the turn to rule of law rhetoric that
are worth reflecting upon,115 but for purposes of this Article the
most important is the way it was used to present a fairly particular
set of substantive goals as a general, neutral legal framework. In
this the relationship between rule of law rhetoric and NIE is quite
clear. NIE tells us that the functioning of an economy will depend
upon the effectiveness of its institutional matrix, while rule of law
rhetoric tries to fill in the legal component of that effective
framework. 116 At this level of generality they both tend to
depoliticize what actually needs to happen to "reform"
institutions, especially law, which is that somebody needs to
change a whole raft of rules, both general legal rules and rules
respecting legal actors such as courts and lawyers, and that as a
result of those rule changes there are going to be winners and
losers. The extent to which the establishment of any particular
vision of the rule of law shifts power in society is often ignored or
underestimated; the neoliberal rule of law, for example, would
radically redistribute power away from the executive branch,
administrative agencies, and at times legislatures, in favor of the
courts and private actors able to wield market power. Because the
earlier law and development era had been dominated by bilateral
assistance efforts, whether national or private, the problem of
political interference had a different valence." 7 Now that the IFIs
were taking a much larger role they had to deal with the fact that
their foundational documents tell them they are supposed to
refrain from political interference, and invoking the rule of law
appears to have been part of the strategy.
The World Bank and the IMF differ formally in this regard,
though whether that matters is questionable. The IMF Articles of
Association contain no explicit general prohibition against political
interference, though IV.3.b does prohibit political considerations in
115 See generally John K.M. Ohnesorge, Rule of Law, ANN. REV. LAW Soc. SC.
(forthcoming 2007).
116 See Ohnesorge, supra note 40 (evaluating economic claims for rule of law).
117 See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, Law and Development Memoirs I: The Chile
Law Program, 48 AM. J. CoMP. L. 481 (2000) (discussing Chile program in the
1960s); GARDNER, supra note 82 at 282-88 (describing the relationship between
American "legal missionaries" and Third World legal actors).
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connection with certain decisions. The IMF legal staff interprets its
Articles like a corporate charter, however, looking to the Articles,
particularly Article 1, to assess whether a proposed activity would
be ultra vires. As former IMF General Counsel Francois Gianviti
recently noted, however, because the IMF has ultimate authority to
interpret its own "charter," the openness of the text leaves no
doubt that this is a matter of self-policing,1 8 constrained in the end
by power politics. The World Bank, on the other hand, has to deal
with Article IV, Section 10 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement,
which provides:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political
affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their
decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall
be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall
be weighted impartially in order to achieve the purposes
stated in Article 1.
In the early 1990s World Bank General Counsel Ibrahim
Shihata issued a legal opinion that essentially defined this
prohibition away, at least with respect to law and development
activities. 119 Signaling that the Bank's lawyers were not going to
get in the way of a new law and development agenda dominated
by NIE thinking, Shihata characterized the "rule of law" as basic to
the "governance" structure that is necessary for a successful
economy. 120 This seems to sanction any law and development
project that could be cast as furthering the rule of law, which turns
out to be a pretty big set. In a memorial for Mr. Shihata, IMF
Senior Counsel Robert Effros singled out this memo as important
in legitimating IFI law and development activities, 121
demonstrating a strange commitment to formal legal regularity by
118 See Francois Gianviti, Evolving Role and Challenges for the International
Monetary Fund, 35 INT'L LAW. 1371, 1374 (2001) (discussing the broad language
and interpretive power of the IMF).
119 See Robert C. Effros, The World Bank in a Changing World: The Role of Legal
Construction, 35 INT'L LAW. 1341, 1345-47 (2001) (evaluating Dr. Sihata's view of
law and development).
120 See id. (discussing law as the formal instrument of order in society); Frank
K. Upham, Comment, Speculations on Legal Informality: On Winn's "Relational
Practices and the Marginalization of Law", 28 L. & Soc'y REV. 233, 234 (1994).
121 See Effros, supra note 119, at 1345 (discussing the importance of Dr.
Sihata's opinions).
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organizations that, at least on this issue, are really checked only by
power, not by law.
Although many criticisms have been leveled at the Washington
Consensus and the neoliberal rule of law orthodoxy that
accompanied it, it would be a mistake to believe that orthodoxy
was repudiated as dramatically as was the modernization
approach. Instead, as evidence mounted that the world was more
complex than that approach contemplated, and that many people
in poor countries were not necessarily benefiting from neoliberal
economic and legal reforms, the neoliberal rule of law seemed to
evolve in two distinct directions. Those two strains, "proto-
orthodoxies" of law and development, represent the dominant
discourse today.
2.4. The Legal Origins of Orthodoxy: Law and Finance, Legal
Origins, and the Common Law-Civil Law Divide
The first of the two current proto-orthodoxies is based in large
part upon what is known as the "legal origins," or "law and
finance" literature, which grew out of work in the mid-1990s by a
group of financial economists interested in the effects of legal
systems on financial system performance. 122 Their initial focus was
on financial markets and minority shareholder protections in legal
systems around the world, hence the name "law and finance," but
the legal origins approach is now much broader than those initial
beginnings.123 The basic method of the literature is formal and
analytic, seeking to test statistically various hypotheses concerning
relationships between legal system attributes and economic
performance, differences between common and civil law traditions
being one major example. 124 Various aspects of national legal
systems are given numeric scores, which are then combined with
122 Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131
(1997); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. EcoN. 1113 (1998); Mark J.
Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARv. L. REV. 460, 470
(2006).
123 See Ohnesorge, supra note 42, at 487 (explaining that new legal origins
literature takes into account "broader social phenomena" such as economic
growth); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins (Harv. Inst. of Econ.
Research, Paper No. 1920, 2001), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=267852. See
also Emma Phillips, The War on the Civil Law: The Common Law as a Proxy for the
Global Ambition of Law and Economics, WIS. INT'L L. J. (forthcoming 2007).
124 See Kenneth W. Dam, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance (The
Chicago Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 303, 2006) (introducing his
paper by comparing common and civil law).
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scores from other countries and used as the data for statistical
testing of hypotheses concerning legal systems and socio-economic
outcomes.
25
Whatever this literature's ultimate contribution to science,
126 it
is also serving as an important source of policy prescriptions, as is
clear from the fact that it is having a major impact within at least
some at the World Bank.127  The Bank's "Doing Business"
reports, 128 which have been produced annually since 2004, presents
this "disciplinary" side of the legal origins/law and finance
literature, converting its scholarly claims into a program for
encouraging private sector growth in developing countries. Three
of the original 'LLSV' authors, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, have been closely involved in the Doing
Business, as has Simeon Djankov, another prolific 'legal origins'
125 See Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of LaPorta et
al.'s 'Anti-Director Rights Index' under Consistent Coding (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin
Ctr., Working Paper No. 7, 2006) (recoding the Antidirector Rights Index).
126 The approach has generated a good deal of skepticism. See, e.g., Roe, supra
note 122, at 464 (explaining why the consideration of legal systems may not be as
important as once thought for policymaking); Spamann, supra note 125, at 2
(finding a less significant difference between civil and common law systems after
correcting the ADRI analysis of La Porta and Djankov); Dam, supra note 124
(attributing a greater importance to governance than legal systems in assessing
economic growth); Phillips, supra note 123; Allen et al., infra note 131, at 2 (citing
China as a notable counterexample of the studies of La Porta et al., boasting one of
the fastest growing economies despite poor legal and financial systems); Graff,
infra note 132, at 8 (concluding that reasonable explanatory alternatives to the Law
and Finance Theory exist); Ohnesorge, supra note 42, at 490 (using China as an
example of how sophisticated legal systems are not a necessary prerequisite to
economic growth); Udo C. Braendle, Shareholder Protection in the U.S.A. and
Germany: On the Fallacy of LLSV 3 (Univ. of Manchester Sch. of L.) available at
http://www2.jura.uni-hamburg.de/le/braendle.pdf (illustrating the weaknesses
in the Law and Finance Theory through a comparative analysis between the legal
systems of the U.S. and Germany); Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling
Law & Finance and Comparative Law 25 (Univ. of Cambridge Ctr. for Bus. Research,
Working Paper No. 321, 2006) available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/
WP321.pdf ("The world-wide distinction between different legal families, such as
common Law and (French, German, Nordic) Civil Law is not useful for
[econometric] calculations.... ").
127 See Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law" Promise in
Economic Development, in Trubek & Santos, supra note 3, 253, 279-80 (describing
the World Bank's efforts to encourage legal reforms through the creation of online
resources for policymaking).
128 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2007: How TO REFORM (2007);
WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2006: CREATING JOBS (2006); WORLD BANK, DOING
BUSINESS IN 2005: REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH (2005); WORLD BANK, DOING
BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION (2004).
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writer, and Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto.129 De Soto,
famous for his claim that formalities and inefficiencies in the legal
systems of developing countries keep the world's poor from
enjoying the benefits of capitalism,130 shares with the legal origins
school an interest in assigning numerical values to legal system
attributes, which can then be used in cross-country statistical
analysis.
Again leaving aside the literature's value as social science, the
relationship between its analytic and prescriptive aspects seems
highly problematic. The vast majority of lawyers and legal
academics will not have the expertise to question the statistical
methods used by the authors of these studies, nor will they have
the resources to challenge the data that provides the grist for the
statistical mill. This is not to defend intellectual laziness, but to
argue that as a source of policy prescriptions this literature seems
particularly prone to reductionism. Looking to the specific claims
of the literature, one would expect that equity markets would play
an important role in financing the businesses that must lead
development, and that legal protections for minority shareholders,
which allegedly support such markets, would therefore also be
important.' 31 Developing countries with common Law systems
should therefore out-perform Civilian regimes, as common law
regimes are associated with more developed equity markets and
better protection of shareholders.132 Common law regimes should
129 WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, at vii
(2004).
130 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1989); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE
MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS
EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
131 See Dam, supra note 124, at 8-9 (discussing the theory that financial market
development predicts economic growth); La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of
External Finance, supra note 122, at 5 (showing that countries with poorer investor
protections have smaller and narrower financial markets); La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, supra note 122, at 1116 (showing that common law countries generally
have stronger protections for investors than civil law countries); Hideki Kanda, A
Note on the Law Matters Debate in Corporate Governance, 1 U. TOKYO J. L. & POL. 87
(2004); Franklin Allen et al., Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China (Univ. of
Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 03-21, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=365641 (examining why China differs from other
countries in the study of economic growth).
132 See Dam, supra note 124, at 8 (explaining La Porta's findings that common
law regimes offered the greatest protection to shareholders and creditors); Allen,
et al, supra note 131, at 1 ("One of the central results of the literature is that,
countries with English common-law origin (French civil law origin) provide the
strongest (weakest) legal protections to both shareholders and creditors.");
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also outperform Civilian regimes because governance in Civilian
regimes is associated with high levels of formalities, seen as stifling
private initiative and encouraging bureaucratic rent-seeking. 133
Finally, Civilian adjudication is also inferior to common law, in
that it is less able to bring about flexible refinements to legal rules
that need to be changed, 34 while Civilian regimes are also
associated with generally Statist orientations, as opposed to the
liberty-regarding, market-friendly common law.135 As should be
apparent, there is an obvious overlap between the prescriptions of
the legal origins approach and the earlier neoliberal rule of law
orthodoxy, although the former is built upon a much more
intimidating analytical foundation.
2.5. The "Comprehensive Development" Rule of Law
[E]nsuring human rights and freedoms is critical both for the
development of the economy and for the social and political life of Russia.
- Vladimir Putin136
While the legal origins literature offers a social-scientific basis
for policy prescriptions that largely track the Washington
Consensus, the current alternative proto-orthodoxy defines itself
by its rejection of the Washington Consensus approach.
Associated with the Comprehensive Development agenda
developed in the late 1990s by James Wolfensohn when he was
World Bank President,137 the Comprehensive Development
Michael A. Graff, Myths and Truths: The "Law and Finance Theory" Revisited (Swiss
Inst. for Bus. Cycle Res., Working Paper No. 122, 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=881546 (analyzing the weaknesses in the law and
finance theory).
133 See Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J. L., ECON. & ORG.
222 (1999) (analyzing why larger governments perform better than small ones);
Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry (Harv. Inst. of Econ. Research, Paper
No. 1904, 2001), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=242738 (showing why
regulation of start up firms actually increases corruption).
134 Simeon Djankov et al., Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8890, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
307127 (showing that formalism is greater in civil law countries).
135 Rafael La Porta et al., The Guarantees of Freedom (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin.,
Working Paper No. 02-05, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=297145
(distinguishing English freedoms from American freedoms).
136 Peter Finn, Putin Touts Rule of Law to Reassure Investors, WASH. POST, Apr.
25, 2005, at A12.
137 James D. Wolfensohn, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development
Framework (January 21,1999) (on file with author).
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approach predictably claims that legal system functioning is
somehow intimately connected with development, but expands the
claim to include human as well as property rights, and labor and
personal rights laws as well as property, contract, bankruptcy and
other commercial law.138 The following attempt to articulate a role
for law reform in this broader development approach is typical:
Without the protection of human and property rights, and a
comprehensive framework of laws, no equitable
development is possible. A government must ensure that it
has an effective system of property, contract, labor,
bankruptcy, commercial codes, personal rights laws and
other elements of a comprehensive legal system that is
effectively, impartially and cleanly administered by a well-
functioning, impartial and honest judicial and legal
system.139
The rule of law, revived in the earlier Washington Consensus
orthodoxy, is still the unifying rhetorical concept ("the sine qua
non of development" in the words of the World Bank), but what
developing countries need now is the "comprehensive
development" rule of law, which:
[P]revails where (1) the government itself is bound by the
law; (2) every person in society is treated equally under the
law; (3) the human dignity of each individual is recognized
and protected by law; and (4) justice is accessible to all. The
rule of law requires transparent legislation, fair laws,
predictable enforcement, and accountable governments to
maintain order, promote private sector growth, fight
poverty, and have legitimacy.140
The World Bank's justification for a recent loan to the
Venezuela Supreme Court loan, for example, is that an "improved
judicial system will help enhance social and economic development
138 See Rittich, supra note 41 (explaining that the Comprehensive
Development Framework requires attention be paid to issues such as "health,
education, and gender equality" as well as "human rights, good governance, and
the rule of law"); Ohnesorge, supra note 115, at 6 (emphasizing that the idea of
due process and other natural human rights is inherent).
139 Wolfensohn, supra note 137.
140 WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM 2-3 (2004)
(emphasis added).
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through improvement in the enabling environment for private
investment and building confidence in the judiciary."141
As if designed to insulate the Bank from criticism from any
quarter, this approach suggests that nearly anything we typically
hope to get from a legal system-justice, fairness, equality,
vindication of our rights-is somehow importantly related to
development. NIE is still available for the proposition that all
governance is somehow economic governance, 142 and if the
Washington Consensus rule of law spoke mostly to the neoliberal
agenda for property rights and a non-interventionist state, the
comprehensive development orthodoxy would fill in the other half
of the circle by including a focus on "the social," as Kerry Rittich
puts it.143
In doing so, the comprehensive development approach
effectively returns to a "modernization" mentality with respect to
the scope of the law and development agenda, as it revives the
modernization tendency to define development much more
broadly that simple economic development. Unfortunately, it also
revives the modernizer's confident tone of standing at that
Archimedian point from which power and knowledge can be
deployed, via legal technical assistance, to remake (someone else's)
society. For example, in a project involving a loan to the Supreme
Court of Venezuela intended to help it improve itself, the Bank
employed a "participatory" approach to designing the project
itself, under which "stakeholders" are brought in to the process to
help define goal and implementation, not merely as sources of
information, as under the "external experts" approach. 44
Although on the face of it this "stakeholder" approach seems
obviously preferable to the "external experts" approach, it also
looks like an attempt to preempt criticism of political interference
141 WORLD BANK, REPORT No. 17212-VE, PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT ON A
PROPOSED LEARNING AND INNOVATION LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$4.7 MILLION TO
THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA FOR A SUPREME COURT MODERNIZATION PROJECT, at
Annex 1, (1997) (emphasis added), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/17/000009265_3980217140241/
Rendered/PDF/multipage.pdf.
142 Id. at 16 ("Lessons derived from 'New Development Economics' indicate
that it takes time for modernizing societies to learn and internalize new rules of
the game, and that institutional change is incremental.").
143 See Rittich, supra note 41, at 203-04 ("The [comprehensive development
framework] pronounces that greater attention must now be paid to its 'social,
structural and human' dimensions.").
144 WORLD BANK, supra note 141, at 18 (describing the participatory approach).
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by getting all the potential complaining parties to the table. This
resembles the logic of negotiated rulemaking and other "new
governance" experiments in the United States, 145 but our own
experience suggests that this is no guarantee that outcomes will be
perceived as legitimate, as parties that lose in this process are not
likely to disappear quietly, unless their opportunity to object is
somehow cut off.146 Another example can be found in USAID's
Public Interest Legal Advocacy Project (PILAP) in Cambodia,147
which seems to have embraced an impact litigation model and
sense of certitude right out of the 1960s.148
3. TESTING THE ORTHODOXIES AGAINST NORTHEAST ASIA
Although one could certainly contest aspects of the intellectual
history outlined above, in its broad outlines the evolution of the
law and development orthodoxies seems well-accepted. The next
task, then, is to test the claims of those approaches against common
understandings of the ways in which law functioned in Northeast
Asia during the decades of rapid economic development. As will
become clear, none of these theoretical approaches was developed
empirically from study of Northeast Asia, nor do any of them fare
very well when their claims are tested against Northeast Asia as a
case study.
3.1. Modernization (and its Discontents) Meet Northeast Asia
Turning to the orthodoxy of the first law and development
movement, the modernization approach of the 1960s, what do we
find if we examine its claims through the lens of the Northeast
Asian experience? Looking at the performance of Northeast Asia's
145 For an example of "new governance" literature, see Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
146 See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (drawing question to the value of
formal negotiated rulemaking).
147 See Rule of Law: Success Stories: Legal Advocacy Project Wins Against
Government Municipality in Cambodia, http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/
democracy-and-governance/ technical-areas/ rule of law/ss5.html (last visited
Mar. 13, 2007) (describing a successful legal challenge by landowners).
148 PILAP selects legal cases that have strong potential to generate publicity
and debate, and that demand broader accountability and respect for legal norms -
beyond the mere bounds of the case. Thus, while protecting individual clients'
rights, PILAP also hopes to demonstrate the legal system's viability as an
instrument to generate greater transparency and respect for the rule of law. Id.
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legal systems over the past several decades, there is no doubt that
legal instrumentalism was ever-present in authoritarian South
Korea and Taiwan, as well as in democratic Japan. Governing
elites saw law as a tool they could use to control their societies, and
retained levers with which they could exert political control over
their judiciaries that extended even to decisions in particular
cases.149  Northeast Asia thus took the instrumentalism of
modernization's "liberal legality" one step further, as the
instrumentalism envisioned by legal legality involved enacting
general laws with instrumental purposes, but then leaving
enforcement in particular cases up to the judiciary. Liberal legality
essentially trusted that the judiciary would keep consequences and
instrumental aims appropriately in mind, while still deciding
individual cases in ways that would seem free from too strong an
instrumentalist taint.150 Instead, even in Japan, where judicial
independence was best institutionalized, individual judges were
sometimes disciplined for particular decisions that displeased their
superiors within the judicial bureaucracy.'51 Although the
noteworthy instances of such discipline were generally politically
charged cases, especially in Japan, those cases were highly
publicized, so any judge would have known of the possibility of
punishment in case he decided "wrongly" according to those
above. Law thus did not achieve the degree of autonomy called for
even in the instrumental vision of liberal legality, and certainly not
the level called for in later rule of law orthodoxies.
What about other aspects of the "modem" legal system called
for in the 1960s? During their highest growth decades all of the
countries in Northeast Asia limited the numbers of fully licensed
149 On Japan, see Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants?
Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 421 (2005) (reviewing
competing explanations of how Japanese judges are controlled). On Taiwan, see
Hsiao-Ming Wang & Leanne Fiftal Alarid, Judicial Sentencing Decisions in Taiwanese
Economic Crimes: Consequences of Swift Justice," 35 L. & Soc'Y REV. 607-25 (2001)
("By law, judges in Taiwan, like their American counterparts, should make their
judgment independently. However, the promotion and transfer of Taiwanese
judges are controlled by the Judicial Yuan, the highest authority of judicial
administration in Taiwan. Hence, this chain of command may impact judicial
decisionmaking...."); on Korea, see DAE-KYU YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL
AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA (1990).
150 Trubek & Galanter, supra note 38, at 1100.
151 See Upham, supra note 149, at 433 (citing studies showing that Japanese
judges were often disciplined by the Secretariat for their acquittal decisions,
regardless of legal inaccuracy).
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lawyers to a tiny fraction of what an American, at least, would
consider normal.152 No doubt the existing lawyers tended to favor
this protectionism, but at least in authoritarian Taiwan and Korea,
one would not expect the legal professions to have sufficient
political clout to obtain such a privileged position unless it also
happened to benefit the political leadership, in which lawyers did
not generally play a central role. In Korea and Taiwan, then, the
extreme paucity of lawyers seems best explained as resulting from
political choices to limit lawyers' social role and influence, while in
the case of Japan the private interests of the bar or of industry
probably played a bigger role in that policy outcome. In any case,
though, lawyers in Northeast Asia even now have not become the
free-ranging problem solvers of the modernization model, greasing
the wheels of commerce one moment, protecting citizens from
arbitrary state action the next. It is fair to say that they never really
transcended the limited, formalist mode that offended liberal
legalist sensibilities in the 1960s, nor for the most part did the
judiciaries.
Again, as discussed above, judicial formalism in Taiwan and
Korea should be understood in the context of political
authoritarianism, in which assertions of power by the judiciary
could be career ending, or perhaps worse. 53  In such an
environment, formalist reasoning probably feels like the safest
course to the judge, as technically competent formalist reasoning
will be convincing enough to get the job done in most cases,
especially since the legal profession and legal academy share the
formalist mindset. And in "hard" cases, where the law is
obviously in doubt, or which involve obviously political concerns,
formalism offers a refuge that the "modern" practices of open-
ended policy analysis and the balancing of interests do not. In the
Japanese context there is debate over whether politicians should be
seen as the ultimate "principals" disciplining judges, or whether
the judicial bureaucracy was essentially independent from the
political side of government, with the top of the judiciary
152 Korea, for example, had only 811 lawyers in private practice in 1977.
Kyong Whan Ahn, The Growth of the Bar and the Changes in the Lawyer's Role:
Korea's Dilemma, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 119 (Philip
S.C. Lewis, ed. 1994) [hereinafter LAW AND TECHNOLOGY].
153 In the early 1970s, Seoul National University law professor Tsche Chong-
kil, who had recently returned from a lengthy stay at Harvard, was murdered by
Korea's Central Intelligence Agency. Panel Recognizes Professor Killed in 1973 as
Democracy Martyr, KOREA HERALD, May 28, 2002.
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disciplining lower judges based upon its own criteria. 54 Perhaps
contributing to the continued formalism in Northeast Asia's legal
professions and judiciaries was the fact that legal education in
Northeast Asia remained highly formalist, 4entered on learning the
provisions of the fundamental statutes, and their interrelations
with one another. Yet all this "backwardness" coincided with not
only with rapid economic growth, but also with dramatic
improvements in broader "modernization" indices such as rising
education levels and improving life expectancies.
Having satisfied ourselves that Northeast Asia got the best of
the liberal legality and modernization theory, we should now ask
ourselves why Northeast Asian societies now seem bent on finally
establishing long absent pillars of the "modern" legal systems
many foreign observers were not sure they needed. Beginning
around 1990, the countries of Northeast Asia have entered into a
multi-pronged effort at legal reform that seems driven by
something very much like the modernization ethos. Starting,
where else, with legal education, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan
are all in the process of introducing "American-style" law
schools. 155 Japan has gone the furthest to date, licensing over
seventy graduate-level "law schools," nearly all of which are
located at universities which also have existing undergraduate and
graduate law faculties. 56 South Korea is currently planning to
open graduate level law schools at eight to ten universities by
2008,157 and Taiwan is actively studying the situation.158 Though
the actual motives of the many parties involved in these processes
will obviously vary, a central stated purpose of these initiatives is
to improve legal education by getting away from the abstract,
doctrinal teaching that has characterized undergraduate legal
154 See Upham, supra note 149 (presenting the contending positions).
155 A special issue of the Wisconsin International Law Journal contains
papers on legal education reform in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. 24 WIs. INT'L L. J. 1
(2006).
156 Sixty-eight law schools were licensed to open in April 2004, and four more
were licensed to open in April 2005.
157 See Dong-yoon Chung, Law School Reforms Deserve Due Diligence, KOREA
HERALD, Jan. 5, 2007; Chung Ah-young, American-Style Law School to Debut in 2008,
KOREA TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005; Hae-in Shin, American-style Law School Plan Causes
Controversy, KOREA HERALD, May 19, 2005.
158 See Chang-fa Lo, Possible Reform for Legal Education in Taiwan: A Refined
"I.D. System"?, 1 ASIAN J. COMP. L. issue 1, art. 7 (2006), http://www.bepress
.com/asjcl/voll/issl/art7 (discussing Taiwan's possible adoption of the
American J.D. system).
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education in the region, as in the civil law world generally
(according to the American view). For example, to become more
practically oriented, the new schools in Japan are experimenting
with clinical legal education and inviting practitioners and judges
to teach.159 This more practical education is supposed to turn out
lawyers closer to the pragmatic problem-solvers of the
modernization model. Getting students to pay attention to this
new, practical curriculum requires changing the national bar
exams, which have focused heavily on mastery of doctrine, much
of it learned from cram schools and extra-university study.'
60
Japan is therefore changing its bar examination,161 while Koreans
are also discussing an "American style" bar exam to accompany
the "American style" law schools.1
62
Coming in tandem with the creation of the new schools are
moves to raising passing rates on national bar exams, so that the
graduates of these new schools should enjoy a much greater
chance of actually joining the bar than undergraduate law majors
previously had.163 While in the case of Korea it might be possible
to achieve high passage rates for new law school graduates
without increasing the total admitted to the bar per year by
limiting the number of new schools and students, 164 the Judicial
Reform Commission's proposal along these lines was immediately
criticized for abandoning real reform in the face of protectionist
159 See Lawrence Repeta, Omiya Law School and the "All Day Clinic," 25
WASEDA BULL. COMP. L. 39 (2006); Peter A. Joy et al., Building Clinical Legal
Education Programs in a Country Without a Tradition of Graduate Professional Legal
Education: Japan Educational Reform as a Case Study, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 417 (2006)
(discussing the use of clinical programs in Japan's law schools).
160 For a penetrating discussion of the relationship between Korean legal
education and the Korean bar exam, see JAMES M. WEST, EDUCATION OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN KOREA (1991).
161 Hisashi Aizawa, Japanese Legal Education in Transition, 24 WIs. INT'L L. J.
131, 147-50 (2006) (discussing Japan's new bar examination).
162 Shin, supra note 157.
163 It is actually misleading to talk about passing rates for bar exams as they
have functioned in Northeast Asia. What they had were in fact numerical quotas,
rather than passing rates.
164 Korea, which licenses approximately 1,200 new lawyers per year, is
reportedly aiming for an 80% passage rate for graduates of the new law schools,
but is contemplating in the range of 150 students at each of the 8 to 10 schools,
Shin, supra note 157, in which case no dramatic increase in the total number
passing the exam should be necessary.
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pressures from the legal establishment. 165 Although it may take
some time, it seems clear that increasing the total numbers passing
the bar will have to be part of the overall reforms. An increase in
the size of the Japanese bar is much more certain. Having already
allowed over seventy new graduate law schools to open, Japan will
not be able to reach the high passage rates that were originally part
of its new law school plan unless the annual quota is increased
substantially. Given the high opportunity costs for many new law
school students as compared with undergraduate law students,
low passage rates would upset a lot of people.
With more lawyers, the story goes, societies will become more
law governed, and more oriented towards the assertion of rights
via litigation; in a word, more "rule of law."166 Reforming legal
education should also get at the "problem" of judicial formalism, at
least in the long term, though to expedite the process Japan and
Korea are also planning to introduce lay participation in some
areas of adjudication, interjecting potentially counter-formalist
forces into the process. 67
All these new, practically oriented lawyers need something to
do, and rather than wait to see whether they can create demand for
their own services, governments in the region have simultaneously
been engaged in a series of law reforms that depend upon
increased private litigation. Specifically, all three countries have,
over the past ten to fifteen years, amended their corporate and
administrative law regimes to encourage, respectively, litigation by
corporate shareholders against management, and by private
165 Editorial, Bigger Quotas Needed at New "Law Schools," HANKYOREH
SHINMUN, April 23, 2005.
166 See Katsumi Yoshida, Legal Education Reforms in Japan: Background,
Rationale, and the Goals to Be Achieved, 24 WIS. INT'L L. J. 209, 214 (2006) ("The ideal
reform, as expressed in the report [of the Japanese Justice System Reform
Council], was the realization of the rule of law, meaning that law with core values
of liberty and fairness should permeate the state and society in Japan, taking root
in the lives of ordinary Japanese people.").
167 Using the term "jury" is potentially misleading given differences between
these proposed institutions and the Anglo-American ideal type. Nor are they
modeled exactly on Germany's "lay assessors," however, so using the English
translation of the civil law's main example of lay participation would also be
misleading. On Korea, see Jong-moon Kim, Reform Panel Sees Juries in Place by
2007, JOONGANG DAILY, 1, col. 6, May 17, 2005; Chi-hyoung Cho, Judicial Reform:
Proposed Civil Participation in Criminal Justice Process, KOREA HERALD, May 31, 2005.
On Japan, see Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice
System, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 935 (2004).
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parties against government agencies.168 Like other civilian legal
systems, 169 those of Northeast Asia have not relied heavily on such
"private" enforcement to achieve systemic goals such as
constraining corporate management or government agencies. In
keeping with the current trend, however, shareholder litigation is
being actively encouraged by various technical fixes to procedural
rules and corporate statutes, 170 as well as the enactment of
shareholder class action statutes or other shareholder-centered
systems using litigation to constrain management.
17'
Administrative litigation is being encouraged by the enactment of
general administrative procedure statutes, which include some
citizen participation in rulemaking, information disclosure laws,
amendments to "administrative litigation" statutes, and the
creation of dedicated administrative courts or benches.172 In doing
so, they are opting to move towards the very "modern" idea of
enlisting private interest, channeled through private litigation, in
the public task of regulating corporate and government
bureaucracies.
168 For more specifics on these reforms, see John K.M. Ohnesorge, Politics,
Ideology, and Legal System Reform (forthcoming) [hereinafter Ohnesorge, Politics].
On administrative law reforms, see John K.M. Ohnesorge, Western
Administrative Law in Northeast Asia: A Comparativist's History (2002)
(unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law); Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling
the 'Developmental State'? Administrative Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea, 49 AM.
J. COMP. L. 585 (2001).
169 See Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici, Financial Scandals and the Role of
Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 40/2005, 2005) (analyzing the effects of Parmalat on both sides of the
Atlantic).
170 See Ohnesorge, Politics, supra note 168; Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to
the Korean Commercial Code and Their Effects on International Competition, 21 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 273 (2000) (discussing changes in Korean law which enhance
shareholder's rights and ability to litigate).
171 See Joongi Kim, The Next Stage of Reforms: Korean Corporate Governance in
the Post-Asian Financial Crisis Era, 1 ASIAN J. CoMP. L., issue 1, art. 15, at 19 (2006),
http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol1/iss1/art5; Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit
Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence from East Asia, 29
YALE J. INT'L L. 169, 185 (2004); Dae Hwan Chung, Introduction to South Korea's New
Securities-Related Class Action, 30 J. CORP. L. 165, 168 (2004) ("One of the reform
measures the [Korean] government has implemented is a class-action lawsuit
system for use against securities-related firms.").
172 See John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the Northeast Asian
Mirror, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (2006); Ohnesorge, Politics, supra
note 168; Ginsburg, supra note 168, at 586 ("Japan and Korea passed
Administrative Procedure Laws for the first time in 1993 and 1996 respectively.").
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In doing so, moreover, these societies are moving in a direction
that may have represented the consensus view of legal modernity
circa 1970, but which, in the United States at least, has become very
much contested terrain. Shareholder litigation as actually
practiced in the United States is under constant attack from
academics, 7 3 politicians, 174 and even newspaper columnists, 175 as is
the "adversarial legalism" of America's regulatory culture, 7 6 and
the idea of administrative law plaintiffs functioning as "private
attorneys general." 177 While it might be possible to develop
interest group explanations for all these reform initiatives, to
attribute shareholder litigation reforms to local plaintiffs bars or
institutional investors, for example, it is hard to avoid the sense of
a modernization ethos at work, with an idealized version of the
U.S. system again providing the model. Shareholder litigation is
considered a much more central part of corporate governance in
173 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 55-56 (1991) ("Critics of the shareholder suit
assert that most of the suits are frivolous and that the plaintiff's bar is the true
beneficiary of the litigation .... ).
174 During the 1990s Congress enacted two statutes to constrain shareholder
litigation, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
175 See George F. Will, Bull Market in Innuendo, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at
B9 (defending President Bush's nomination of Representative Christopher Cox to
chair the Securities and Exchange Commission). For an overview of the
movement to constrain shareholder litigation, see Michael A. Collora & David M.
Osborne, Class-Action Reforms Spur Derivative Claims, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 15, 1999, at
B8.
176 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
(2001) (explaining criticisms of adversarial legalism); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L.
HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990) (providing examples of failures of
adversarial legalism).
177 In the federal courts, the battle has played out in the domain of standing
doctrine, with critics of the private attorney general model, led by Justice Scalia,
seeking to limit the ability of Congress to expand standing via "citizen suit"
provisions. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167 (2000), was a clear defeat for Scalia, but he and his allies have been
fighting this battle since the 1980s, and there is no reason to think they will give
up now, especially since Bush appointees Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
have joined the Court. For an overview, see William W. Buzbee, The Story of
Laidlaw, Standing and Citizen Enforcement (Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 05-13, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=721643. For a resounding defense of the idea, see James R. May, Now
More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suites at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1
(2003).
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the United States than in other influential corporate governance
regimes,178 and with respect to administrative law, reforms such as
information disclosure laws and rights of public participation in
administrative rule making clearly have U.S. roots. But if we
actually look at how shareholder and administrative litigation
function in the United States, which as Trubek and Galanter
pointed out long ago is exactly the kind of inquiry the
modernization ethos biases us against, 7 9 we might ask whether the
"modern" U.S. system has resulted in better performance by either
corporate management or by administrative agencies than that
achieved in Northeast Asia. American corporate management may
be more sensitive to short-term shareholder interests as a result of
our active shareholder litigation culture, but that may come at the
expense of longer-term outlooks that might benefit shareholders
over the longer term, may make management too risk-averse, and
perversely, might also pressure management to try to cover up
negative financial results, resulting in real fraud. Our
administrative litigation culture, by the same token, is hard to
translate into better performance in specific regulatory fields,
environmental and workplace safety regulation being primary
examples, or into public legitimacy for the regulatory state.
What this all suggests is a different possible validation of
modernization thinking, based on the idea that there is a logic of
convergence that drives national legal systems towards a common
set of characteristics. 180 But this is not a simple economic logic, like
some contemporary convergence arguments, because it is clearly
driven only in part by economic forces. Rather, the logic of this
convergence seems to be more cultural, in the sense of being driven
by the spread around the globe of a set of common ideals with
respect to the performance of national legal systems. 181 While this
mechanism is much more contingent and diffuse than the elite-led
transition from traditional to modern in modernization thinking,
178 See Ferrarini & Giudici, supra note 169 (arguing that private litigation is a
more important part of enforcement of corporate law in the United States than
Italy).
179 See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 38, at 1081-82.
180 On convergence assumptions in modernization theory, see Ian Weinberg,
The Problem of Convergence of Industrial Societies: A Critical Look at the State of a
Theory, 11 CoMp. STUD. Soc'Y & HIST. 1 (1969).
181 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY,
AND CULTURE 201-02 (1990) (positing that legal systems in Western or developed
countries are all being driven by a similar logic).
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this may make it all the more irresistible. The reason this trend
matters for law and development is that it is in full force at the
time when Northeast Asian governments are themselves becoming
active purveyors of legal development assistance.1 82 One might
have hoped that as Northeast Asian governments entered the law
and development business themselves they would base their
advice on realistic appraisals of how various areas of law
functioned when they were developing countries. This seems not
to be the case however, as the law and development efforts of
Japan and Korea do not appear to offer much more nuance than
the current international mainstream, and do not seem to be based
on realistic self-assessment. 183 Korea, for example, has joined the
effort to convince developing countries of the great benefits of
active competition policy despite the fact that Korea did not even
have a competition law on the books until 1980, after roughly
twenty years of high-speed growth. 8 4
If modernization theory does not hold up well when
confronted with the Northeast Asian experience, however, its chief
antagonists, the dependency and world systems approaches, do
not fare all that much better. Despite the fact that dependency and
world systems thinking produced no orthodoxy oriented toward
domestic law reform, for the same reasons that it is instructive to
test law and development orthodoxies against Northeast Asian
realities, it is also instructive to line up the broader economic and
political claims of dependency and world systems theory against
the Northeast Asian record. At one level, the Northeast Asian
experience can serve as Exhibit A for those seeking to demonstrate
the fallacies of these approaches. 85 As a descriptive matter,
Northeast Asian states, beginning with Japan in the late nineteenth
182 See Ginsburg, supra note 172 (discussing law and development initiatives
of Japan and Korea).
183 See Taylor, supra note 6 (analyzing various aspects of law and
development projects in Japan).
184 See Joseph Seon Hur, Dir. Gen., Korea Fair Trade Commission, Capacity
Building and Technical Assistance in the Area of Competition Policy: Korea's
Experiences and Suggestions, Presentation to the OECD Global Forum on
Competition (Feb. 14, 2002) (transcript available at http://ftc.go.kr/
data/hwp/20020214.doc) ("Korea adopted competition law in 1980 .... ).
185 See, e.g., Richard E. Barrett & Martin King Whyte, Dependency Theory and
Taiwan: Analysis of a Deviant Case, 87 AM. J. Soc. 1064 (1982) (analyzing conflicting
features of Taiwan's economy); Alice H. Amsden, Taiwan's Economic History: A
Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory, 5 MOD. CHINA 341 (1979)
(arguing that the economic history of Taiwan contradicts dependency theory).
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century and followed by Taiwan and Korea after 1950, were not
consigned by the world capitalist system to permanent
membership in the periphery. Rather, while the world capitalist
system was in full force, all three moved from the periphery to
either the core (Japan), or close to it (Korea, Taiwan). This suggests
that even if the categories of periphery, semi-periphery, and core
capture basic descriptive truths about the world, to deny that their
borders are permeable, at least under some conditions, is overly
deterministic. In addition, if the developmental state theorists are
correct, then dependency theory's specific distrust of the Third
World state, one of its critiques of the modernization school, must
be tempered. Furthermore, Northeast Asia's climb up the world
systems hierarchy did not merely coincide with a global economy;
rather there is near universal agreement that engaging in world
markets was crucial to their achievements. Thus, if a prescriptive
aspect of dependency and world systems approaches is that the
global capitalist order produces the categories of the world system
and that countries should therefore "de-link" from the
international system in some systematic way,186 the Northeast
Asian experience can again provide a counter story. In fact, while
one would have to search long and hard to find a country that has
moved up the hierarchy by religiously following a free-market,
free-trade orthodoxy, it would be equally hard to find lasting
success among countries that have taken the "de-linking" advice of
the dependency school very seriously. In any case, however, in
our post-WTO, globalizing world "de-linking" hardly seems
possible or normatively attractive to developing country policy
makers, whereas the countries of Northeast Asia, which have made
arguably the greatest advances within the world systems
framework, have in fact been tightly integrated into the
international trading system.187
If one looks a bit deeper, however, one finds substantial points
of connection between dependency theory and the Northeast Asian
experience. First, it seems clear that to many Northeast Asians the
186 For a de-linking argument, see SAMIR AMIN, DELINKING: TOWARDS A
POLYCENTRIC WORLD (Michael Wolfers trans., 1990) (1985).
187 International financial markets are a different story, however. See Russell
Mardon, The State and the Effective Control of Foreign Capital: The Case of South Korea,
43 WORLD POL. 111 (1990) (discussing the integration of foreign capital into
Korean industry); Robert Wade, East Asian Financial Systems as a Challenge to
Economics: Lessons from Taiwan, CAL. MGMT REV., Summer 1985, at 106 (discussing
Taiwanese financial markets).
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picture of the world presented by dependency and world systems
theorists seemed largely accurate. The world actually is divided
between the "haves," who command the industrial, technological,
financial and military heights, and the "have nots." Furthermore,
as inheritors of proud cultures and histories, many Northeast
Asians seem to have shared with dependency theorists the notion
that they were among the "have nots" largely as a result of
imperialism, although perhaps combined with some poor
decisions on their own part. Although this mindset sees the
possibility of movement up on the world systems ladder, it rejects
the idea of de-linking, and in fact sees the possibility of progress
only in aggressive engagement with the global economy; to many
observers it is essentially mercantilist rather than liberal. The
global economic order is treated with caution, and while
widespread import substitution was of limited duration in
Northeast Asia, a concern for self-reliance was reflected in the
creation of elaborate mechanisms to channel and moderate
connections with the international economy.188 While Northeast
Asian governments behaved as if the levels of the international
economic order were upwardly permeable, they also behaved as if
they were downwardly permeable, if international economic forces
were left unmediated. Northeast Asian economic development
may present a "challenge to dependency theory," to use economist
Alice Amsden's phrase from an early essay on Taiwan,189 but that
challenge is based on a different set of solutions more than on a
different diagnosis of the essential problem facing poor countries.
For this reason, scholars of Northeast Asian economic thought
have long explored the influence of Friedrich List, the nineteenth
century German theorist, on Northeast Asian economic thinking.190
List's nationalist prescriptions for late-industrializing Germany,
and his critique of the cosmopolitan free-trade advocated by Adam
188 Appeals to self-reliance are of course used to justify simple interest-group
protectionism, but particularly in the case of South Korea, the drive for national
technological competence seems clearly in part based on national concerns for
self-reliance.
189 See Amsden, supra note 185, at 341-79.
190 See RICHARD J. SAMUELS, RICH NATION, STRONG ARMY: NATIONAL SECURITY
AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF JAPAN 5-8 (1994) (detailing Japan's
changes in technology); Ohnesorge, supra note 35, at 315-16 (discussing Freidrich
List's influence); Kenneth B. Pyle, Advantages of Followership: German Economics and
Japanese Bureaucrats, 1890-1925, 1 J. Japanese Stud. 127 (1974) (discussing the
influence of List's writings on East Asia).
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Smith, bear a much closer resemblance to Northeast Asian trade
practices than do the prescriptions of dependency theory.191
3.2. Northeast Asia and the Neoliberal Rule of Law
Leaving aside the matter of rule of law rhetoric masking power
politics, and the question of whether the mistakes of the
modernization era were being repeated, how do the claims of the
neoliberal rule of law orthodoxy fare when compared with the
Northeast Asian experience? Not very well, it turns out, at least
not in strong form. First, on the level of private law and private
property rights, the Northeast Asian experience provides good
reason to think that constitutional law protecting property rights is
not crucial to the overall development picture. Despite the fact
that development was basically privately lead, the dictators who
oversaw development in Korea and Taiwan were unconstrained by
constitutional law in any direct sense, showing it not to be
necessary even to the relatively equitable economic growth that
should please progressives. Clearly a political commitment to
capitalism is enough, both for local entrepreneurs and for foreign
investors, as China is demonstrating once again.
Furthermore, as we know from the United States' experience,
even a very firmly established system of constitutional review is
not really sufficient to protect private property, if protection means
insulation from regulation or compensated takings, as well as from
uncompensated takings. Property rights absolutism in the United
States is a political agenda that is simply not reflected in
constitutional law, as the Supreme Court's "regulatory takings"
jurisprudence and recent eminent domain decision show.192 The
Court has proven to be unwilling to expand the regulatory takings
doctrine to protect property rights from anything but the most
extreme economic destruction via regulation,193 but has never
provided property owners with clear guidance as to what is the
actual scope of the doctrine. 94 Likewise, in Kelo the majority of the
Court extended its century-long generous interpretation of "public
191 See FRIEDRICH LIsT, THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
(Sampson S. Lloyd trans., 1885) (1977) (reveling List's economic theories).
192 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
193 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF RIGHTs 88-112 (2001) (providing example of court being unwilling to
expand the regulatory takings doctrine).
194 See id. (providing example of vagueness of doctrine).
270 [Vol. 28:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/1
DEVELOPING DEVELOPMENT THEORY
use" under the Fifth Amendment, which essentially facilitated the
taking of property by government via eminent domain. It also
highlighted the extent to which the narrow position advocated by
the plaintiffs, and accepted by the dissenters, has its basis more in
political ideology than in American economic history.
This is not to suggest that property rights in the United States
are an illusion, or that developing countries should not have
constitutional law and judicial review to protect them. But
whether a country is a dictatorship, like Korea and Taiwan were in
their high-growth eras, or a democracy, like the United States and
post-WWII Japan, the idea that law and development activities can
lead to the locking in of "rules of the game" protecting private
property from the state is fanciful, and perhaps downright
dangerous. Because so much neoliberal rule of law theorizing
seems to have been driven by the problems of 1990s Russia,195 it is
useful to consider subsequent events there. It is unclear how far
President Putin will go in reasserting the powers of the Russian
State to undo the "reform" privatizations of the early 1990s, which
Russian analyst Anatol Lieven calls "the single greatest example of
such plundering in the whole of modern history," which "crippled
the ability of the Russian state to provide basic services to its
population -including for long periods even wages and
pensions." 196 But Putin's rise is clearly a reaction to the neo-liberal
excesses of that period,197 and we (and, most importantly, the
Russians) will now just be very lucky if his counterrevolution stops
short of real authoritarianism.
The story with administrative law is much the same, with even
democratic Japan contradicting the orthodoxy in important ways.
All three countries maintained extensive regulatory screening
systems to modulate cross border flows of technology and capital,
and the bureaucracies responsible for these screens had a great
deal of discretion to operate them free from the fear of judicial
195 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, supra note 105; Gray, supra note 87 (presenting an
overview of how the collapse of command-and-control economies in the former
Soviet Union has given particular impetus to new worries and questions about the
state's role).
196 Anatol Lieven, Is Khodorkovsky Really the Victim?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June
10, 2005, at 7.
197 See id. (suggesting that Putin's authoritarianism was somewhat
understandable in light of the Oligarchs' exploitation of the laissez-faire
atmosphere immediately following the demise of the Soviet Union).
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challenge. 198 In the words of an American lawyer practicing in
Japan in the early 1960s,
[I]t might be well to state explicitly that the "rule of law,"
insofar as it is intended to connote judicial review of
economic determinations of governmental agencies, is
virtually nonexistent in Japan. [With respect to foreign
exchange and foreign investment control laws] the criteria
for administrative decision are nothing but restatements of
the broadest policy considerations. Beyond this there is
nothing, and an appeal for judicial review of a decision of
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry to allow,
say, a twenty-five per cent foreign equity holding in a joint
venture corporation instead of a forty-nine percent holding,
or a Ministry of Finance determination to allow only a five
per cent rate of interest on a validated loan from abroad
instead of an eight per cent rate, would be unprecedented;
the mere suggestion of it, in fact, sounds fatuous.199
These screening mechanisms the Northeast Asian governments
erected between their economies and the international economy
drove the industrial policy debate of the 1980s as well as the
developmental state tradition in economics and political science,
and it is no coincidence that "administrative guidance," the
tendency of Northeast Asian administrators to rely on unwritten
suggestions instead of formal dispositions, became the aspect of
Northeast Asian administrative law that really interested the West.
But on purely domestic matters, as well, there is broad agreement
among observers that government-business relations were
comparatively unstructured by formal administrative law. So even
198 See F.L. Hartman, Japanese Foreign Investment Regulation: Semantics and
Reality, 18 N.Y. L.F. 355, 355 (1972) (explaining that in Japan, "businessmen and
government officials maintain that local companies continue to need paternal
governmental protection from foreign competition and foreign capital."); Kung-
Chung Liu, Legal Environment for Technology Transfer in Taiwan, 36 INT'L LAW. 1145,
1154 (2002) (discussing the debate within Taiwan as to "whether to give IP right
holders the exclusive right to import goods produced with their permission ...
."); Russell Mardon, The State and the Effective Control of Foreign Capital: The Case of
South Korea, 43 WORLD POL. 111, 113 (1990) (examining the governmental
strategies that allowed South Korea to benefit from foreign inflows of capital
while preventing foreign control of businesses and the markets).
199 Carl J. Bradshaw, Selected Legal Aspects of Business in Japan, 14 STAN. L. REV.
639, 680-81 (1962).
[Vol. 28:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/1
DEVELOPING DEVELOPMENT THEORY
if the Hayekian picture state-society relations put forth in the
neoliberal rule of law orthodoxy is problematic with respect to the
United States, which it certainly is, it even less accurately describes
the role of administrative law in structuring state-society relations
during the Northeast Asian miracle. This seems clear, moreover,
whether one accepts the "developmental state" claim that it was
the state that maintained the upper hand in state-society relations,
or whether one believes with either the traditional left, or with
rational choice observers, that the state essentially served certain
private interests. From either angle the relationships did not fit the
rule of law orthodoxy.
As for the alleged centrality of modem property and contract
law to the functioning of the market, Japan and Taiwan, and
arguably to a lesser degree Korea, all had highly evolved
commercial traditions prior to the importation of Western legal
rules and institutions, which were imported en masse in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, more or less
simultaneously with the importation of Western communications,
transportation, manufacturing, and organizational technologies.
To borrow from the lingo of modernization theory, there occurred
a "Big Push" in importing Western governance as well as
mechanical technologies, and under those circumstances attempts
to isolate and evaluate the contribution to development of some
particular legal institution are going to be extremely difficult.
Moreover, two of the oldest stories on the Asian law shelf concern
the lack of formality in private contracting relations-short
contracts, relationships matter more than form anyway, etc.200 -
and the low incidence of litigation.201 Informality in contracting is
not so much a problem for law and development theory, as NIE
includes social and cultural norms within the institutional matrix,
and the literature contains numerous references to non-contractual
relations, 202 informal trading networks, 203 and the importance of
200 See Veronica Taylor & Michael Pryles, The Cultures of Dispute Resolution in
Asia, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ASIA 1, 1-2 (Michael Pryles ed., 1997) (providing
specific details on Asian transactions and disputations). For evidence that this
tradition persists, see Craig Parry, Do Business in Japan by Following the Way of
'Wa,' CORP. COUNS., Nov. 20, 2006 (suggesting that in Japan, the relationship of
trust developed between two businessmen is more important than the specific
terms of their eventual agreement).
201 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Legal Institutions, and Economic
Development, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 152, at 7 (exploring a few
general ideas and theories about the relationship between law and society).
202 See, e.g., Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, Q. J. ECON., May 2003, at 453, 453
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alternative dispute resolution.204 The problem comes more at the
level of practice, where calls to pay attention to all these non-legal
realities, which might differ from country to country, ethnic group
to ethnic group, or industry to industry, seem to give way to the
perceived need for top-down reform.205 But if social norms really
do matter, and if law is also potentially potent, as it must be for
social engineering through law to make any sense as all, then it is
not hard to imagine fouling up well-functioning markets with ill-
conceived top-down law reforms.
Northeast Asia's low litigation rate presents more of a problem
because the orthodoxy seemed to make strong claims for the
necessity of competent, efficient, user-friendly courts to a
successful market economy.206 This is not the image of Northeast
Asia's courts that has prevailed among observers, however, where
the practitioners have long bemoaned the situation, and the main
academic discussion has been over whether low litigation rates
were culturally or structurally driven.207 This was always a bit
misleading, however, as Northeast Asian business people certainly
took legal disputes to court, but the reality of that litigation is quite
far removed from the rhetoric of the orthodoxy. The fact that
Northeast Asians have now decided to encourage litigiousness,
discussed above, does not change the reality of the earlier era.
(citing ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relationships in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963)).
203 See, e.g., Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A
Survey of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999) (citing Avner Greif,
Contracting, Enforcement, and Efficiency: Economics Beyond the Law, in ANNUAL
WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1996 239 (Michael Bruno
& Boris Pleskovic eds., 1996)).
204 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, supra note 99, at 93 (describing the important role
that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have played in Russia and East
Asia).
205 See, for example, the unenthusiastic response of World Bank economist
Cheryl Gray to Robert Cooter's call for law reforms to be based upon existing
social practices. Cheryl W. Gray, Comment on Robert D. Cooter, "The Rule of State
Law and the Rule-of-Law State: Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations of
Development," in WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
1996, at 218.
206 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996, supra note 99, at 93-94.
207 See Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An
Empirical Analysis of Japan's Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31 (2006) (adding
an empirical analysis to the academic debate on structural versus cultural barriers
to litigation).
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Finally, if one examines the specific legal fields that loom large
in the orthodoxy, areas such as insolvency law, competition law,
and corporate law, it is not hard to show that the roles claimed for
them in the orthodoxy do not match the roles they played in
Northeast Asian economic development. The most glaring
example is intellectual property law, which in Northeast Asia has
failed, and continues to fail, to live up to the demands that
mainstream law and development literature would place on
developing countries. Korea and Taiwan are still perpetual
offenders under United States trade laws designed to pursue
foreign governments that do not effectively protect United States
intellectual property rights.208 At the very least this shows that
protection of foreign intellectual property plays an uncertain role
in economic development, and depending upon whether domestic
IP holders used the legal system to protect their interests during
the high growth era, it may be that even the importance of IP law
for domestic purposes should be reexamined. Formal insolvency
regimes were relatively little used,2 9 and competition law was
notoriously unsuccessful as a tool for combating cartels.210
Although Japan's Fair Trade Commission is now undertaking a
high-profile attack on a bid-rigging cartel among specialized
bridge building firms, 211 this cartel existed for over forty years, and
was so little concerned with the law that it published and
distributed rule books to relevant employees from member
companies. Japan may now be using the law more aggressively to
enforce competition, but it has been a long time coming.212 And
208 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 42 (2005) (describing
the steps taken by Korea over the past year to significantly strengthen its
intellectual property regime).
209 Terence Halliday & Bruce Carrothers, Epistemological Conflicts and
Institutional Impediments: The Rocky Road to Corporate Bankruptcy Reforms in Korea
(Am. B. Found., Working Paper No. 2211, 2003).
210 See John 0. Haley, Competition Policy for East Asia, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 277, 278 (2004) (arguing that competition law can only be effective
when the state is not itself imposing structural barriers to competition); Kozo
Yamamura, The Development of Anti-Monopoly Policy in Japan: The Erosion of
Japanese Anti-Monopoly Policy, 1947-1967, in 2 STuD. IN L. & ECON. DEv. 1, 22 (1967)
("[T]he present Japanese pro-monopoly policy has successfully emasculated all
but a few remnants of ... anti-monopoly legislation as it existed after World War
II.").
211 Kazuhiko Takeshima, Chairman, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, Remarks for
the Session on "Cartels and Other Anti-Competitive Agreements" (Nov. 4, 2006).
212 Japan's Fair Trade Commission can take a comparatively aggressive
stance when it wants to, as it has in taking action against Intel for "exclusionary
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while modern corporate law completely penetrated these
economies in the sense that the important firms were organized
and operated as corporations, or networks of corporations, the
reality was far from the model. In Taiwan the most important
corporations were either controlled by families or by the Party-
state apparatus of the Kuomintang, while in Korea the important
corporations were virtually all family or state controlled. 213
Minority shareholder rights existed on paper, of course, but
judicial enforcement of those rights did not play a serious role in
corporate governance.214 Even in Japan, where corporate law
mattered more to the reality of corporate governance, shareholders
exercised control mainly through large, relatively stable holdings,
not through threat of litigation, to enforce their legal rights.21
5
3.3. Legal Origins and Northeast Asia's Development
As noted above, although the neoliberal rule of law vision
remains part of the picture, the center of gravity in the law and
development world has shifted in the direction of two very
different "proto" -orthodoxies, the legal origins and the
comprehensive development approaches. As with the
modernization and neoliberal rule of law orthodoxies, it is
instructive to compare the claims of these approaches with the
Northeast Asian experience. Turning to the legal origins approach
first, the most obvious thing to say if one thinks about the
Northeast Asian experience is that these were all fundamentally
pricing" policies that may not be actionable in the United States. See, e.g., Spencer
Ante, AMD Hauls Intel Back to Court, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, June 28, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2005/tc200506286337
_tcll9.htm (describing the suit filed by Advanced Micro Devices on June 27
against chip giant Intel "for a series of alleged antitrust violations AMD says are
aimed at crippling the smaller chipmaker").
213 See Claessens, supra note 32, at 3 ("We also find that smaller firms are
more likely family-controlled, as are older firms.").
214 See Yin-Hua Yeh, Tsun-siou Lee & Tracie Woidtke, Family Control and
Corporate Governance: Evidence from Taiwan, 2 INT'L REV FIN. 21 (2001) (using a
sample of Taiwanese firms to analyze the relationship between corporate
governance and family control); Yin-Hua Yeh & Tracie Woidtke, Commitment or
Entrenchment?: Controlling Shareholders and Board Composition, 29 J. BANKING & FIN.
1857, 1859 (2005) ("Taiwan represents an ideal setting to examine these issues
because it features relatively weak protection of minority shareholders....");
Kim, supra note 171, at 18 ("Weak public and private enforcement remains one of
the biggest challenges in Korea as in much of Asia.").
215 See Milhaupt, supra note 171 (explaining shareholder enforcement schemes
in East Asian countries).
[Vol. 28:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/1
DEVELOPING DEVELOPMENT THEORY
civilian legal regimes, whether in the formal attributes of the law,
or in the organization and functioning of institutions such as the
judiciary, the legal profession, or legal education. Whatever
advantage can be proven for the common law through the use of
statistical models, having a civilian legal system cannot be much of
a handicap. But even though these were all basically civilian
systems, they were also all hybrids to one degree or another with
respect to corporate and securities law, which had been influenced
by U.S. norms, so "coding" them for cross-country statistical
comparison presents serious problems.216 In addition, however,
the history of Northeast Asian law is replete with "legal
transplant" failures, in which the imported rule or institution did
not function as hoped. Coding these legal systems, or any other for
that matter, therefore cannot be fixed by just paying attention to
hybridization of the formal legal rules, but could only be plausible
if supported by sustained research into actual legal system
functioning, the law "in action."
Turning to more specific issues, Northeast Asian corporations
have succeeded under very different models of corporate
governance, and in none of these models did corporate law
provide extensive protections for minority shareholder rights. The
prototypical corporation in Taiwan and Korea was dominated by
controlling shareholders, with no separation of ownership and
control. These owners were in turn checked by a variety of forces,
including the competition of product markets, the "exit" option
enjoyed by shareholders, and interventionist governments
controlling the banks from which they borrowed. Legal rights of
minority shareholders were inconsequential. As is well known, the
dominant pattern in Japan was different, with ownership and
management separated, but with monitoring of management again
provided largely through forces other than minority shareholder
rights to sue management. Given the central role corporations
have played in Northeast Asian economic development, it is hard
to argue for the importance of minority shareholder rights on
development grounds, unless one is already assuming the
superiority of stylized Anglo-American capitalism, which of course
faces its own Northeast Asia problem.
Other policy prescriptions one might draw from the legal
organs literature fare a little better. The deep and liquid financial
216 See Spamann, supra note 125 (discussing coding problems in the legal
origins literature).
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markets that the early law and finance studies associated with
common law jurisdictions can be efficient allocators of capital, but
bank-centered financial systems are clearly compatible with
successful economic development. Likewise activist,
interventionist governments, which this literature associates with
the civil law tradition, can clearly go hand in hand with
astounding economic development, even if they can also be prone
to red-tape and rent-seeking, as the literature tries so hard to
demonstrate. Finally, judicial independence, for which this
literature seeks to provide an economic development rationale,
hardly thrived during Northeast Asia's most rapid economic
development. Like other elements of the legal origins policy
package, the argument for judicial independence seems to rely on
background assumptions about the superiority of a stylized Anglo-
American political economic tradition, assumptions which
Northeast Asia's economic miracle should call into question.
It is telling that in its eight pages the References section of
Doing Business 2004: Understanding Regulation 217 contains not a
single reference to scholarship on Northeast Asian economic
development in any field, let alone scholarship on the role of law in
Northeast Asian development, and only one piece authored (co-
authored, actually) by a serious student of Northeast Asian law.218
Perhaps the bias this proto-orthodoxy displays against civilian
jurisdictions is simply a failure in sample selection, but that seems
unlikely given the technical sophistication of the scholarship and
the stakes involved. Whether the selection bias was outcome
driven, or due to some morbid tendency to study failure, it is
glaring considering Northeast Asia's dramatic success.
3.4. Comprehensive Development and Northeast Asia
The comprehensive development approach has much to
commend it, at least to those who share its underlying assumption
that having a decent society involves more than just "getting the
rights right," and the approach may help insulate law and
development projects from criticism, at least from the left. But a
clear-eyed look at Northeast Asia's experience suggests that the
217 WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, supra
note 128, at 97.
218 See Katharina Pistor et al., Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. COMP. ECON.
676 (2003) (suggesting that resilience of the corporate form is a function of the
adaptability of the legal framework to a changing environment).
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approach is either wrong, or succeeds only through redefining
development in a way that risks the ethno-centrism of the
modernization approach. We have seen how Northeast Asian
legal systems failed important aspects of the neoliberal rule of law
orthodoxy, but comprehensive development fares even worse,
though this is not surprising since in many ways it just represents
an addition of additional items to the laundry list, rather than a
fundamentally different approach. When we look at some of these
additional items, their failures become equally clear.
Labor rights in Northeast Asia have long been criticized by
local and foreign observers, 219 for example, and the Korean case is
particularly interesting for being criticized by both the left and the
right. The left claimed, accurately, that the government cooperated
with business in using illegal means to suppress independent
unions, trying to instead coerce a system of company (not trade)
unions, which would all belong to the docile, government-
approved national peak union.220 Business groups, meanwhile,
complained that Korean labor markets were insufficiently flexible
because of the protections the law provided to individual workers.
To give but one example, Korea, like Japan,221 does not allow at-
will termination, 22 a provision that particularly baffled American
investors. Perhaps the simplest way to understand Korean labor
regulation is as paternalist, meaning that it rejected a free-market
model by including comparatively rigid protections for those
worker interests that it recognized, but at the same time
discouraged litigation to enforce these rights, and also discouraged
labor from organizing in ways that would allow it to become a
political force in its own right, participating in the definition of its
219 See, e.g., FREDERIC C. DEYO, BENEATH THE MIRACLE: LABOR SUBORDINATION
IN THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 66 (1989) ("[Tlhe available impressionistic
evidence points to a trend toward increasingly unfavorable outcomes for labor.").
220 See James M. West, South Korea's Entry Into the International Labor
Organization: Perspectives On Corporatist Labor Law During A Late Industrial
Revolution, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 477, 525 (1987) (discussing other forms of state
interference with labor autonomy).
221 See Ryuichi Yamakawa, Labor Law Reform in Japan: A Response to Recent
Socio-Economic Changes, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 627, 645 (2001) ("One of the most
distinctive features of Japanese labor law is the case law doctrine of abusive
dismissal.").
222 See Jeong Han Lee, South Korea: Key Limits on Employer Latitude in
Structuring Workforce, (Bae, Kim & Lee PC, 2007), available at
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=46866 (explaining the restrictions
on termination in Korea).
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interests. 223 It seems likely that replicating Japan's labor situation
was the goal of this system, as after the 1950s Japan enjoyed
relative labor peace, while also keeping labor's role in setting the
terms of the overall political economy comparatively limited.
224
Particularly in Korea and Taiwan,225 the state did not stop with
merely legal means to enforce this regime, but also resorted to
illegal measures to keep labor under control.
With respect to civil and political rights, social justice,
sustainable development, access to justice, or the other add-ons
that differentiate the Comprehensive Development approach from
the neoliberal rule of law orthodoxy, Northeast Asia fared little
better during its high-growth decades, and not everything has
changed. In the spirit of Comprehensive Development, the World
Economic Forum ("WEF")
has begun to explicitly incorporate in its measures of
competitiveness aspects of gender equality, recognizing
that, far from being a matter of mere political correctness,
the advancement of women is an important strategic issue.
Countries which do not capitalize in the full potential of
one half of their societies are misallocating their human
resources and compromising their competitive potential. 226
While it is hard to disagree with the proposition that
misallocating its resources makes a country less competitive, the
fact that Korea ranked fifty-fourth out of fifty-eight countries in the
WEF's 2005 gender equality study, while Japan came in at thirty-
eighth,227 suggests that the subjugation of women in Northeast
223 See West, supra note 220, at 522 (referencing criticisms of the South Korean
government's overbroad invocations of the "public interest" to justify denials of
the right to strike).
224 See T. J. Pempel & Keiichi Tsunekawa, Corporatism Without Labor?: The
Japanese Anomaly, in TRENDS TOWARD CORPORATIST INTERMEDIATION (Philippe C.
Schmitter & Gerhard Lehmbruch eds., 1979); DEYO, supra note 219, at 51-86
(discussing general trends in East Asian labor movements).
225 T.K., LETTERS FROM SOUTH KOREA (David L. Swain trans., 1976).
226 AUGUSTO LOPEZ-CLAROS & SAADIA ZAHIDI, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM,
WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT: MEASURING THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP 2 (2005), available at
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GlobalCompetitivenessReports/Reports/
gender-gap.pdf.
227 Id. at 9. The World Economic Forum excludes Taiwan in favor of China,
so Taiwan was spared inclusion. Taiwan would probably do better than Japan or
Korea, though there is no reason to think that has helped it out-compete the other
two in any respect.
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Asia has not been a significant drag on their economies, though
that is no reason not to treat it as a very serious human rights
problem. One might argue, though this would be data dependent,
that keeping women at home working without wages helped
enable rapid development because governments did not need to
provide decent social safety nets, though this would be not be
compatible with the idea of equitable development. The World
Economic Forum invoked the idea of "misallocating resources" in
its argument for gender equality because it evokes the apolitical,
technocratic authority of economics, but the claim is highly
questionable. Women have obviously played enormously
important roles in Northeast Asian economic development, but if
we claim that those roles resulted in the "misallocation of
resources" then it seems that what we have done is to turn
resource allocation into a normative question, and then answered it
by asserting our own values. That is not the answer to the
problems of law and development.
The same argument applies to civil and political rights more
generally, which were severely curtailed in Korea and Taiwan for
decades, with martial law, restrictions on the press, restrictions on
travel, and quasi-police state measures to penetrate all levels of
society.228  Social safety nets were very thin by Western
standards,22 9 and to the extent that "sustainable" development
means environmental protection and forcing manufacturers to
internalize the costs of the pollution they produce, growth was put
over sustainability.230 Nor was access to justice ever given much
emphasis in Northeast Asia, as the formal legal system remained
relatively distant from the lives of ordinary citizens. Legal
professions were intentionally kept tiny compared to general
populations, as were judiciaries, and while other law-related
professions and non-judicial dispute settlement took up some of
the unmet demand, nobody has ever argued that Northeast Asian
228 See JOHN KIE-CHIANG OH, KOREA: DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL (1968) (depicting
the curtailing of rights in Korea); Roy, supra note 21, at 76-104 (describing
Taiwan's one-party rule under the Kuomintang); T.K., supra note 225.
229 Robert Wade, in an early article on Northeast Asian financial systems,
pointed out a possible function for thin social safety nets in Northeast Asia, which
is that they probably boosted savings rates, feeding funds to the state-controlled
banking system, which governments could then use to fund targeted industries.
Wade, supra note 187, at 109.
230 See, e.g., NORMAN R. EDER, POISONED PROSPERITY: DEVELOPMENT,
MODERNIZATION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH KOREA (1995).
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citizenries were given easy access to their formal legal systems.
One can say, therefore, that if the claim is that economic
development, as traditionally understood, requires the
comprehensive development rule of law, then the claim is simply
wrong. The record, in fact, better supports the older economy-first
arguments that it is the suppression of individual rights and
democracy that is somehow positively related to economic
development, and that rights and democracy will come later.
Whatever its other faults, that argument at least benefits from an
obvious correlation in the Northeast Asia experience, where
growth did come before democracy and social advances, whereas
the "comprehensive development" approach is directly
contradicted. It is clear, though, that development for advocates of
the "comprehensive development rule of law," is not limited to
economic development, but has been redefined to include a range
of social aspects beyond economic growth.231 It may be that the
rule of law, whatever that means, is now an end in itself, no longer
a means to an end as it had been presented in the neoliberal rule of
law vision.232 But then there is a circularity problem: if we define
"development" to include right/value X, then a legal system that
enshrines and effectively protects right/value X is going to be a
prerequisite to development. This move just brings us back to the
"modernization" mindset, in which development lost any concrete
grounding, and came to mean being the way we wished ourselves
to be. This is problematic on several grounds, however, some of
which have been raised already.
First of all, Northeast Asian societies, despite not conforming to
any of the law and development orthodoxies, are highly successful
societies in many respects. In fact, it often seems to be Northeast
Asia's successes, whether in building cars, in life expectancy, or in
education, raise international standards and thus push us to do
better. Thus there is something deeply ethnocentric about any
attempt to build a comprehensive ("modern") socio-legal model to
be sold to today's developing countries that does not take
Northeast Asia seriously. Furthermore, given that law and legal
231 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 281 (1999) ("Public policy has
a role not only in attempting to implement the priorities that emerge from social
values and affirmations .... ").
232 Rittich, supra note 41, at 203 ("[Probing] the manner in which the IFIs are
managing the incorporation of social justice and greater participation in the
development agenda .... ").
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systems are intensely political, there are good reasons to be
skeptical about ever-expanding definitions of their tasks by law
and development practitioners, especially from the IFIs. Any law
and development approach is going to be political, and law and
development orthodoxies inevitably involve normative pictures of
how their creators wish the world were. But limiting the objective
to some measure of economic performance seems less imperialistic
than an open-ended mandate to remake societies. And even
though law and development practitioners can always fall back on
the formal excuse that they are simply doing what's been
requested by the local government, if a legal field is at all contested
in a society, an invitation from the current regime will very likely
just mean siding with the winner in very political local debates.
233
This is not only playing in local politics in everything but the most
formalist sense, but it also means that reforms pushed through in
this way will very likely lack the true local ownership that would
give them real stability.
4. BEYOND CRITIQUE: NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT FROM THE NORTHEAST ASIAN PRACTICE
Despite Northeast Asia's unquestioned developmental success
in the economic, social and political arenas, and the enormous
body of research that success has spawned in other fields, none of
the important law and development orthodoxies developed as of
yet comes close to capturing the dynamics of law and development
in the region. But this Article is not simply a critique. Part IV,
below, suggests a new approach to law and development work, an
approach informed by the ways in which the existing orthodoxies
233 The IMF and World Bank initiatives in Korea resulting from the Asian
Financial Crisis certainly had this flavor, as the left-leaning government of
President Kim, Dae-Jung used the opportunity to push through measures against
the Korean chaebol that were opposed by conservatives. See, e.g., Kim, supra note
7, at 68-69 (describing the process by which Korea restructured its financial
markets); WORLD BANK, REPORT No. PID6726, KOREA -FINANCIAL AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING ASSISTANCE PROJECT 1 (1998) ("With support by the IMF and
World Bank adjustment lending, the authorities then stabilized the economic
situation and encouraged the drastic restructuring of banks and corporations. In
doing so, the Government that came to power in 2/98 seeks to also address some
of the fundamental beliefs and behaviors that had contributed to the structural
problems in the economy."); see also WORLD BANK, REPORT No. 25214,
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT ON A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$48
MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR A FINANCIAL AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING ASSISTANCE PROJECT, (2003).
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have failed the Northeast Asia test.
4.1. The Limits of Critique
Criticism of law and development orthodoxies is important,
both as a way to challenge existing approaches, and as an exercise
that can encourage critical thinking about relationships between
law, economics, politics and social life. But when new bursts of
law and development activity come, it often seems as if criticism of
the last round, if noted at all, has had limited impact. It seems
clear, for example, that Trubek and Galanter's attack on the
assumptions of the first law and development movement has had a
more lasting effect on legal thought, through its contributions to
the Critical Legal Studies and Law and Society movements, than it
has on the law and development agenda as such. For anyone
interested in affecting law and development practices it is
important to consider why this might be.
One possibility might be simple political ideology, and some
criticisms seem based on the idea that the staff of places like the
World Bank or the IMF is the problem.234 There is certainly some
truth to that, for it is clear that currents in the economic academy
affect thinking about development, which affects law and
development activities. 235 But the World Bank at least appears to
be staffed more with moderate, internationalist liberals than with
ideologues, 236 so one would expect them to be sympathetic to
reasoned arguments that their approach to law and development is
not working.237 Great Power politics also clearly matters, so the
goals of the United States in particular are going to be reflected to
some extent in law and development activities by the IFIs.238 But
234 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLIrZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002)
(attributing rigidity of IMF policy prescriptions to ideological zeal).
235 See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-
2000, in Trubek & Santos, supra note 3, at 19 (discussing periods of legal,
institutional, and conceptual change); Mohan Gopalan Gopal, Law-Dependent
Public Goods: A Proposed Strategic Framework for a Results-Based Approach to
Legal and Judicial Reform (manuscript, on file with author) (discussing
international assistance for legal and judicial reform).
236 Sebastian Mallaby, What Wolfowitz Faces, WASH. POST, May 30, 2005, at A21
(describing resistance by World Bank staff to new president, Paul Wolfowitz, and
estimating that "[pjrobably 90 percent of the bank's staff opposes the Iraq war,
and a similar proportion regard President Bush as a dumb cowboy.").
237 For proof that this is the case, see Gopal, supra note 235.
238 See STIGLITZ, supra note 234, at 30 (discussing the power of domestic elites
on the global economy).
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one would have to think that there would be substantial slack in
political control over the Bank and other IFIs, which would allow
law and development practitioners considerable freedom to take
criticism seriously and to experiment with different approaches.
Why is it then that external critiques seem to have so little impact
on law and development approaches?
There may be several factors at play, but certainly one of the
reasons outside critiques have limited bite with respect to the law
and development institutions is that the people in these
bureaucracies who actually do law and development work are
understandably drawn to generally applicable models or
frameworks they can understand and work with. Critiques often
fail to provide such models or frameworks, exhausting themselves
with demonstrations that reforms are political, in the sense that
they benefit one social group or another, or that context is
everything, so that "transplant" problems are insurmountable. But
how is a World Bank, USAID or IMF professional supposed to deal
with the idea that legal and institutional forms are potentially
meaningless until we know everything about the particular milieu
in which they are supposed to operate? They, better than anyone,
likely understand the poverty of simplistic transplantation
approaches. As a USAID official stated when asked to comment
on Douglass North's approach:
Although we have long paid lip service to the importance
of cultural differences and what we used to refer to as
"social soundness analysis,' we have more often assumed
that introducing change based on our own experience will
result in a similar outcome in a developing-country
environment, where different institutions prevail. And we
are very often disappointed with the results.
239
Yet even if the bureaucrat knows that a simple transplant
approach is likely to fail, taking the idea too seriously could be
paralyzing, and for people at the working level of a bureaucracy
paralysis is not an option.
This dynamic can be illuminated by looking at the way law and
development orthodoxies tend to handle ideas that are too
239 Jonathan Conly, Comments on Douglass North's "Understanding the Process of
Economic Change" (Forum Series on the Role of Institutions in Promoting
Economic Growth, Mercatus Center of George Mason University) 2 (June 24,
2003).
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important to ignore, but that also represent fundamental
challenges. Here the work of Friedrich Hayek provides a
wonderful example, as his normative aspirations for
administrative law infused the Washington Consensus rule of law
orthodoxy,240 yet his basic theoretical approach, if taken seriously,
would be difficult for traditional law and development orthodoxies
to digest. To review, Hayek offered a normative vision of the rule
of law that he suggested would maximize the predictability of the
legal system to private actors, thus facilitating market ordering.241
Hayek, like his followers in the neoliberal rule of law tradition,
then claims that observation of this rule of law is "a necessary, but
not yet a sufficient, condition for the satisfactory working of a free
economy." 242 Just as Weber felt that formal rationality would tend
to frustrate democratic forces and those who wished to use law to
further their substantive connitments, 243 so Hayek's rule of law
would
preclude[s] all those measures which would be necessary
to insure that individuals will be rewarded according to
another's conception of merit or desert rather than
according to the value that their services have for their
fellows -or, what amounts to the same thing, it precludes
the pursuit of distributive, as opposed to commutative,
justice. 244
Even though Hayek's vision may seem fanciful when one
considers the discretion that administrative law allows to
government actors even in advanced market economies such as the
240 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
241 See HAYEK, supra note 106, at 72 ("[Glovernment in all its actions is bound
by rules fixed and announced beforehand -rules which make it possible to
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given
circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this
knowledge."). Hayek went on to say that "discretion left to the executive organs
wielding coercive power should be reduced as much as possible," so that
"[w]ithin the known rules of the game the individual is free to pursue his
personal ends and desires, certain that the powers of government will not be used
deliberately to frustrate his efforts." Id. at 72-73. See also FRrEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 222 (1960) (" [AIll coercive action of government must be
unambiguously determined by a permanent legal framework which enables the
individual to plan with a degree of confidence and which reduces human
uncertainty as much as possible.").
242 HAYEK, THE CONSTITION OF LIBERTY supra note 241, at 222.
243 See Trubek, supra note 16, at 739.
244 HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY supra note 241, at 232.
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United States, Britain,245 or Germany,246 let alone in the
developmental states of high-growth Northeast Asia,247 it is easy to
see why it is so attractive to law and development practitioners,
and not only those of the neoliberal bent.248 But if one takes Hayek
a bit more seriously, particularly his theory of knowledge, his ideas
should become problematic even to a law and development project
that shares his deregulatory, free-market agenda. The problem
with the philosophical, as opposed to the normative, Hayek is that
he expressed severe doubts about the ability of any person, or
small group, to understand social processes well enough to engage
in effective planning.249 Market outcomes are much less prone to
this epistemological problem because they are "spontaneous
orders," reflecting the aggregation of individual decisions taken
with personal knowledge and out of self-interest, and the common
law is exulted over the civil law (and modern statutes) precisely
because it develops through a similarly informal, disaggregated
process. Such skepticism concerning our ability to grasp the
workings of society well enough to engage in planning hardly fits
with any of the law and development orthodoxies surveyed here,
however, as they all assume that putting the correct legal
framework in place will bring about the social changes they desire.
And it is no escape from this dilemma to propose just putting in
place the minimal legal framework of the "night watchman state"
and then letting market forces operate, because we are always
dealing with real societies, with real histories, and with existing
distributions of wealth and power, which would have to be
245 See DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 24 (1986).
246 See Edward Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299
(1997) (arguing that German administrative officials in fact wield a great deal of
discretionary power).
247 See Ohnesorge, supra note 172.
248 Of course discretion can also be characterized as "flexibility," which was
praised by an earlier study of Northeast Asian development. See WORLD BANK,
supra note 18, at 167-74; LEROY P. JONES & IL SAKONG, GOVERNMENT, BuSINESS, AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE KOREAN CASE 132-40 (1980).
That flexibility was available because legal systems limited the extent to which
administrative law causes of action could be used to intervene to check
government decisions at the request of private parties, and, arguably, because
relevant government organs enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy from
interest groups.
249 See Ryszard Legutko, Was Hayek an Instrumentalist?, CRITICAL REV., Winter
1997, at 145, 14649.
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understood in order to predict the outcomes that the market would
produce. Although Hayek might not have called this "planning,"
it shares the same fundamental difficulty.
One can see the same dynamic with respect to even the work of
Douglass North, which provided such a central theoretical
justification for the move by the IFIs toward a legal reform agenda
of broad, systemic change, during the 1990s. One can take a very
different message from reading North himself, however, a message
that in some ways echoes Hayek's. North's definition of an
institution now includes pretty much everything that anyone
thinks might affect behavior, including cultural norms and
ideology,25 0 and the fact that developing countries do not present a
tabula rasa means that North's return to this essentially sociological
or anthropological approach 251 makes him a more problematic
theorist of law and development than he was thought to be. For
example, in recent years free-market activists at George Mason
University's Mercatus Center and at the University of Maryland's
IRIS Center have hosted a series of events "to help USAID make its
donor assistance more effective and sustainable by incorporating
insights from the New Institutional Economics into USAID's
programming and delivery of development assistance." 2 2 But a
250 See Douglass C. North, Institutions, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Winter 1991, at
97, 97 ("Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political,
economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules
(constitutions, laws, property rights).").
251 Early in his career North was interested in the work of sociologist Robert
Merton, an important figure in the development of modernization theory. See
Douglass C. North, Autobiography, http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/
1993/north-autobio.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2007). Although North seldom cites
sociologists, his ideas about social institutions and capitalism are not so far from
Weber's. North writes as if he has taken on the mantle of Talcott Parsons,
searching for a universal paradigm of human action that will unify the social
sciences:
It is clear that we had to have an explanation for why people make the
choices they do; why ideologies such as communism or Muslim
fundamentalism can shape the choices people make and direct the way
economies evolve through long periods of time.... I believe that an
understanding of how people make choices; under what conditions the
rationality postulate is a useful tool; and how individuals make choices
under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity are fundamental
questions that we must address in order to make further progress in the
social sciences.
Id.
252 Conly, supra note 239, at introduction.
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USAID employee asked to comment on North's recent work
clearly could not find much of programmatic value in it, politely
"join[ing] the author of this stimulating paper, who says at its
conclusion that he hopes it will inspire scholarly efforts to carry
forward a research agenda essential to improving the performance
of economies over time." 253  It was clear that the USAID
commentator already understood the problem of local context,
asking rhetorically "[h]ow often have we tried to assist developing
country reformers to introduce new laws to boost free-market
competition or to increase transparency or to level a commercial or
political playing field only to be stymied by completely ineffective
implementation of the news laws? The prevailing institutions -
most often informal constraints -beat us most of the time." It
seems obvious that he understood the overwhelming importance
of local social context, so that what he seemed to take away from
his encounter with NIE and North was new lingo to describe what
he already understood.
The dynamic can also be seen in the treatment of the research
by Stewart Macaulay, Ian MacNeil, and others who have long
chronicled the presence in the most developed market economies
of legal informality, relational contracting, and other realities that
are not captured well in simple models of how law and economy
interact.254 They have demonstrated, over several decades of work,
that a great deal of American commerce takes place with only
tenuous connection to the traditional contract law paradigm of
arms-length bargains, resulting in clear contractual rights, which
can then be simply enforced by courts. While these writings are
cited in the law and development literature, like recent writings on
institutions and social norms, each of these literatures, if pushed to
its logical conclusion, will present serious challenges to the
development practitioner charged with instituting legal system
reform in societies and business cultures about which he or she
will likely know very little.
In the marketplace of law and development ideas, then, there
seems to be a very real need for clear prescriptions that affirm the
253 Id. at 3.
254 See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 202, at 55 (" [Blusinessmen often fail to plan
exchange relationships completely, and seldom use legal sanctions to adjust these
relationships or to settle disputes."); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: Mhat We
Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 483 (analyzing discrete contracting in the
broader scheme of human exchange behavior).
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importance of legal system performance to economic development,
yet do so in language that is technocratic rather than overtly
political, while also conforming to the positive view of law held by
donor countries. Thus, even if one accepts the accuracy of the
critique in Section 3, above, there are structural reasons why the
law and development industry will remain impervious to criticism
by counter-example if the counter-examples cannot be packaged
into some sort of coherent alternative program. What follows is a
preliminary effort to show how such a package might be
constructed, based upon fairly well recognized aspects of law in
modern Northeast Asia. Section 4.2. reviews areas of law and legal
system performance that are generally viewed as important for
economic development, yet which in Northeast Asia have often
failed to function in ways demanded by the law and development
literature. Section 4.3. then builds upon these "failures" to offer an
alternative approach to law and development work, an approach
that better fits the Northeast Asian experience, while also
representing a realistic alternative to current law and development
approaches.
4.2. Northeast Asia's Legal "Failures" as the Basis for an Alternative
Approach to Legal Development Assistance
If we look at all the ways in which Northeast Asia's legal
systems fail to meet the claims of the law and development
orthodoxies, we are confronted with quite a catalogue of failures.
Legal systems in high growth Northeast Asia failed in many ways
to move beyond formalist thinking, failed to put judiciaries and
problem-solving lawyers at the center of the governance process,
failed to serve as convenient fora for private litigation to enforce
property and contract rights, failed to protect minority shareholder
rights, failed to take intellectual property rights, competition law,
or insolvency law very seriously, and failed to legalize state-
private sector relations through constitutional and administrative
law. This creates a serious problem if, like each of the law and
development orthodoxies discussed here, one wants to claim that
any particular legal system attribute is really necessary for
development. But if one seeks instead to develop a theory of law
and development inductively, by looking at how law actually
functioned in Northeast Asia during high-speed economic growth,
these "failures" disappear, replaced by ranges of performance
amenable to functional analysis in ways that the "failures" view is
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not. The Northeast Asian experience counsels, however, that the
functions of various areas of law cannot be simply assumed, but
must themselves be opened up to redefinition based upon
empirical study.
4.2.1. Northeast Asian Legal Instrumentalism and the
Compartmentalization of Law
With respect to legal instrumentalism, Northeast Asia's
experience establishes a couple of facts. First, instrumentalism
beyond the American "liberal legality" norm associated with the
modernization orthodoxy, whether of the relatively benign
Japanese variety or the virulent Korean style, is perfectly
compatible with rapid economic growth. While this may cause
problems for those committed to traditional legal values, another
strand of the modernization tradition was always a bit skeptical of
lawyers and legality hamstringing the state as it pursued its
modernizing mission.255 But even if one defines development
more broadly, as under the modernization and comprehensive
development approaches, the Japanese experience shows that a
thoroughly modern society can allow a degree of legal
instrumentalism beyond even the modernization model,
accomplished through constraining judges to decide individual
cases according to the norms of the bureaucracies within which
they work.256  Whether the ultimate principals were Japan's
politicians or the judges at the top of the judicial bureaucracy, the
result for Japan has been that the judiciary has not become an
active participant in the overall governance system to anything like
the degree federal courts are in the United States. But it has
become very clear now in the United States that the idea of a non-
political consensus on the independence of our judiciaries, federal
as well as state, was one of those attractive fictions from a less
polarized era.25 7 While this might have disappointed the law and
development practitioners of the 1960s, as it has disappointed
many critics of Japanese public law, it would probably not have
255 GILMAN, supra note 38,at 228-34 (discussing Samuel Huntington).
26 See Upham, supra note 149, at 454 (advocating that a judiciary, constrained
by bureaucracy, can be beneficial for certain systems).
257 See Julian Borger, Former Top Judge Says U.S. Risks Edging Near to
Dictatorship, GUARDIAN, Mar. 13, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
frontpage/story/0,,1729656,00.html (reporting on speech by retired Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor).
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disappointed the Americans who drafted the Japanese constitution
during the occupation era, whose New Deal sensibilities about
judicial versus executive and legislative power were more like
those that have prevailed in Japan.
258
Finally, if we remain uncomfortable with legal instrumentalism
in the Third World, or at home, it is worth asking whether legal
reform programs can be presented in a truly non-instrumental
way. This is an attractive idea, which recurs in places like the
"credible commitments" literature, as it adopts a pre-Legal Realist
faith in the ability of constitutional text and institutional
arrangements to insulate property from politics. But from the
jaded perspective of 2006 it is hard to imagine how this ever could
have been persuasive to Third World elites: "We're here to help
you make your legal system into an effective tool to reorder your
society, but do not try this yourself because law is not a tool."
4.2.2. Legal Education, Legal Professions, and the Social Role of
the Formal Legal System
Several other aspects of Northeast Asia's legal systems that
contradict claims of the law and development orthodoxies can be
understood as relating to the general role of law and the formal
legal systems during the high-growth periods. As we have seen,
legal education remained far too doctrinal and formal to satisfy the
modernizers of the 1960s, while local bars were kept tiny because
governments set very low quotas of those allowed to pass the
licensing exams in any given year. Thus while the people who
became fully licensed lawyers had received traditional civil law
training, and had been forced to memorize enormous amounts of
doctrine in order to pass the exams, they were both extremely
capable, 259 and extremely hard working. Governments also kept
their judiciaries very small by international standards, but being a
judge was an attractive enough career option to guarantee that
very capable people staffed the bench. While the judges who
staffed these judiciaries were on the whole highly competent,
however, they were subjected to supervision and control by
258 See JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE PARADOX 148-49 (1994) (discussing Occupation-era reforms shifting
authority from the Diet to the bureaucracy).
259 This is true even if one believes that there are different ways to define
intelligence, and that ability to memorize and regurgitate material is only one of
them.
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superiors who held fundamentally conservative, pro-development
political views, and who believed in a restrained role for the
judiciary in the governance system.
Undergraduate law departments were numerous, however,
turning out thousands of law-trained graduates each year who had
no hope of becoming fully licensed lawyers, but who instead went
into government service, worked in corporate legal departments,
or worked in one of the law-related professions such as notaries.
Small bars helped guarantee that legal services necessary to access
the formal system would be expensive, despite the fact that many
people received training in law. Furthermore, access to the formal
system was discouraged by professional rules concerning legal fee
arrangements, procedural rules concerning such things as the
posting of court costs, and the fact that litigation consisted not of
"trials" in the United States sense, but of a series of hearings that
could drag on for years even in simple cases. While recent
developments suggest that many in Northeast Asia are no longer
satisfied with this long-standing settlement, the question is
whether it might have played any positive role in the development
process.
One possibility has to do with the allocation of scarce
resources. A possible virtue of this arrangement is that it helped
guarantee that law would be "potent" in that it permeated the
internal workings of both government bureaucracies and business
organizations, a desire that will probably accompany any law and
development effort. It is arguable that this "potency" was
achieved at a relative bargain price, however. Providing
undergraduate legal education through lecturing to large classes
was comparatively cheap, with more labor-intensive training
reserved for those very few who had passed the bar exam and
would staff the formal system, either as judges, lawyers or
prosecutors.
The system's approach to the judiciary might also be seen as a
rational approach to the "potency" problem in conditions of
limited resources. Because the systems generally discouraged both
private and public law litigation, it was possible to spend relatively
little on the judiciaries, yet still have them produce coherent,
technically competent adjudication in those comparatively few
cases that they decided. 260 Furthermore, while many would object
260 This appears to be the consensus view of the Japanese judiciary, for
example, despite other differences among commentators. See Upham, supra note
20071
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to. the control that could be exercised within these systems with
respect to the decisions of individual judges, one effect of that
control was to maintain and enforce a relatively limited role for
law and the courts in the broader political economy. Leaving aside
the dangers of judiciaries subservient to political control, if we
engage in a comparative institutional analysis, considering the
courts alongside the other organs of government, it certainly seems
plausible that from a purely economic point of view the judiciary
should be limited in its ability to define its own role in governance.
Of course the body doing the controlling could let the individual
decision stand, then act politically to limit the undesired extension
of law, but there are reasons that might be difficult. If the decision
is on constitutional grounds even an authoritarian political system
may feel constrained in its ability to change the constitution, or if,
as Haley argues was the case in Japan, the controlling body is the
head of the judicial bureaucracy rather than a political branch, then
that body may have no legal statutory authority, and may prefer to
keep the political branches away from its domain. The style of
legality it produced, however, was more constrained than would
be produced by the more "modern" ideal type of large and
competitive bars, larger and less disciplined judiciaries, and
greater incentives to litigate.
4.2.3. Contract and Property Rights Enforcement
It would be extreme to suggest that a modern market economy
could function without law to define property and contract rights,
and without courts available to adjudicate disputes that will
inevitably arise as market actors transact based upon these rights.
Unfortunately, however, the law and development literature too
often speaks of judicial dispute settlement in binary terms: it is
either available to enforce contracts and property rights, or it is
weak, corrupt, ineffective, or something equally repugnant. A
better way to look at the issue would be to start with the view that
any functioning legal system will again present a trade-off, or
continuum, with respect to its attractiveness to litigants. A legal
system that makes it too easy to resort to litigation will destroy a
certain number of beneficial business relationships that are under
stress but that might be salvaged by the parties were litigation a
less attractive alternative. In other words, judicial dispute
149 at 435 (discussing the ease by which judges are corrupted).
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settlement may "crowd out" private dispute settlement at a cost to
the economy. A legal system that makes private litigation entirely
implausible, on the other hand, would leave enforcement of
contracts to the parties, and property rights to the criminal law.
Northeast Asia's legal systems have been consistently
described as comparatively unfriendly to litigation, a characteristic
that was certainly responsible, at least in part, for relatively low
litigation rates and a perceived tendency to rely on non-judicial
settlement of business disputes. While it may be that this approach
hindered economic development, or was simply irrelevant, it is at
least possible that they settled closer to the ideal point on the
continuum than the United States, for example. In any case, this
experience demonstrates that one ought to ask if a legal system
creates roughly appropriate incentives to private litigation, yet this
question seems absent from much law and development writing.
4.2.4. Intellectual Property Law
Protection of intellectual property rights presents all societies
with tradeoffs. An important tradeoff is that between encouraging
investment in research and development, which is normally
understood to be furthered by rigorous IPR protection, and
encouraging the diffusion of technology and the resulting
competition, which argues for more limited IPR protection. That
this tension between incentive-producing and anti-competitive
aspects of intellectual property protection is not easily resolved is
shown by the fact that the United States Supreme Court recently
decided a key issue concerning the relationship between patent
and antitrust law.261
For developing countries, which by definition have few or no
industries operating at the technological frontier and few
industries with substantial R&D capabilities, an important tradeoff
concerns the cost of acquiring technology from abroad.262 Lax
261 See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (resolving in
the affirmative the issue of whether plaintiffs alleging an anti-competitive tying
arrangement by a patent holder must prove defendant's market power); Tony
Mauro, Supreme Court Considers Limiting Antitrust Suits Against Patent Holders,
LEGAL TIMES, June 21, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1119270947813.
262 For a discussion of these dynamics in the case of China, see Alan Cox &
Kristina Sepetys, Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Litigation, Economic
Damages, and Case Strategies, in ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
293 (Gregory K. Leonard & Lauren J. Stiroh eds., 2005).
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protection for foreign-owned IPR, which can be achieved by the
formal IPR rules, the procedural rules, the technology import
screening regime, or their enforcement, will make it cheaper for
local entrepreneurs to localize many technologies useful to a
developing economy. Whether or not this will benefit the
developing economy as a whole will depend upon whether there
are good reasons to favor local ownership over foreign investment,
whether there are local businesses capable of using the technology,
and if so, whether they use it well.
An admittedly favorable interpretation of the Northeast Asian
experience is that lax protection of foreign-owned IPR can be
successful, though success may have to be defined in part
economically and in part nationalistically. Investment in domestic
educational systems, and the ability to lure back foreign-educated
nationals, provided the necessary technological base for
appropriating foreign technology, while competition, sometimes in
export markets, sometimes in domestic markets, pressured the
domestic technology importers to use the technology productively.
Pressure to export seems to be an important part of the equation,
however, as does a debatable judgment in favor of national over
foreign ownership. In addition, the costs of weak IPR enforcement,
which can include exclusion of products from export markets263 as
well as reduced incentives to local R&D, would have to be taken
into account.
Despite the complexity inherent in this view of IPR protection
by developing countries, it seems preferable to mainstream law
and development approaches. First, it is a view that at least
attempts to make sense of the coexistence of weak IPR and
economic and technological success in Northeast Asia. Second, it
seeks to get beyond the binary "strong" versus "weak" view of IPR
protection, a view that appears too often in the literature despite its
obvious weaknesses. Finally, it is a view that leaves some room for
national government agency. For those who mistrust government
this may be a bad thing, and maybe individuals in Northeast Asia
would be better off now if their national governments had
vigorously and evenly protected local and foreign IPR. But that's
not what those governments did, nor did they seek to insulate the
legal regime so that IPR could be enforced by courts or other
263 For example, United States intellectual property rights holders may
petition to block the importation of goods manufactured abroad in violation of
their intellectual property rights. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000).
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institutions divorced from politics.
4.2.5. Additional Examples
The ability of minority shareholders in publicly traded
corporations to use the legal system to sue managers or majority
shareholders again presents us with a continuum and potential
trade-offs. At one extreme, litigation would be an entirely
ineffective threat, either because of limited legal theories or
because of unfriendly procedural rules, while at the other extreme
management and majority owners would be inhibited from
desirable risk-taking for fear of being second-guessed via
shareholder litigation. The Northeast Asian approach was clearly
far toward the non-threat end of this continuum, which arguably
makes a good deal of sense for a developing country. Shareholders
in publicly traded companies always have the "Wall Street option"
of selling their shares, and one could argue that the last thing
corporate managers in developing countries need is to be
monitored by courts entertaining shareholder litigation, so long as
they are monitored via the criminal law and tax law, by their
creditors, or in some other non-trivial way.
Insolvency law is another example of a body of law that would
have to be deemed a failure in Northeast Asia according to the law
and development orthodoxies. An "effective" insolvency law
regime became part of the neoliberal orthodoxy of the 1990s, but
Northeast Asia's insolvency regimes also would have been failures
in the modernization mindset because they represented bodies of
"modern" law that functioned only minimally, or not in
accordance with their proper purpose. 264  With respect to
insolvency law, a trade-off would involve balancing the benefits of
"creative destruction" and the protection of creditors against
potential costs to industrial development and social stability. It is
not, as the law and development literature typically assumes,
simply a matter of effectively enforcing creditors' rights.
Competition law and policy presents another potential
continuum, and the Northeast Asian approach has been neither
"effective," in the sense of rigorously attacking anti-competitive
practices, nor has it been left free to operate on its own, separate
from larger concerns of political economy. Rigorous enforcement
264 See Ron W. Harmer, Comparison of Trends in National Law: The Pacific Rim,
23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 139 (1997) (discussing Japan's insolvency regime).
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potentially favors competition, and thus consumers, but overly
rigorous enforcement could limit the ability of domestic companies
to achieve the scale necessary to compete internationally. As noted
earlier with respect to the comprehensive development rule of law,
labor law regimes in Northeast Asia have also long been criticized
by local and foreign observers. While this is not a call for
developing countries to violently suppress labor, as the Korean
government was known to do, an empirical approach to law and
development based on Northeast Asia's practices cannot ignore the
realities of the region's labor law. Moreover, these regimes were in
place when the Northeast was achieving not only growth, but
"growth with equity," to use the World Bank's phrasing. Finally,
the limited role of administrative law during rapid development in
Northeast Asia prompts one to weigh the costs of such an
approach against the costs of a more expansive role. If the key task
of administrative law is to ensure a basically law-governed
bureaucracy, then Northeast Asia's bias in favor of internal
bureaucratic controls, including legal education for many
bureaucrats and comparatively high status, may be a reasonable
alternative to facilitating external control via judicial review. But
while keeping the courts in such a limited posture vis-A-vis the
bureaucracy may help facilitate the flexibility for which Northeast
Asia's economic bureaucracies have been praised, there are
obvious costs. Judicial review can be a useful force for
bureaucratic rationality if it forces the bureaucracy to publicly
explain and justify its actions, and of course internal controls on a
bureaucracy may suffer from being enforced by the bureaucracy
itself.
Reducing the foregoing analysis to a "Northeast Asian Law
and Development Chart" would result in something like the
following:
TABLE 1: NORTHEAST ASIA'S LEGAL "FAILURES" IN DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECrIVE
Low Functioning Northeast Asia's High Functioning
(Possible Performance: (Possible
Advantages): Advantages):
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Public Resources Encourages Low (few judges, Facilitates rights-
Devoted to Courts settlement; Frees lawyers based market,
and Facilitating resources for other expensive, business planning
Litigation uses procedural rules
not encouraging
to litigation)
Role of Legal Low (but many
Profession in legally trained in
Society and business and
Governance government)
Contract and Lower Low (short, May facilitate
Property Formality documentation general planning; protect
costs; may documents; rights of weaker
discourage relational party
litigation, contracting)
encourage
negotiated
settlement
Intellectual Facilitates Low Encourages
Property Rights acquisition and investment in
diffusion, R&D, innovation;
especially of avoids trade
foreign IP friction
Shareholder Allows Low Helps keep
Litigation management more management,
discretion to take controlling
risks without fear shareholders
of litigation focused on
interests of all
shareholders;
facilitates external
finance
Bankruptcy Preserves value of Low Facilitates
businesses; "creative
encourages destruction,"
negotiated reallocation of
solutions resources;
encourages
extension of credit
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Antitrust Allows Low (more a Forces competitive
coordination to policy of focus
avoid "overheated regulating cartels
competition"; than combating
facilitates them)
economies of
scale
265
Administrative Frees agencies to Low Enforces limits on
Law (scope and exercise expertise, (comparatively agency
judicial without fear of narrow coverage; jurisdiction;
enforcement) judicial review limited judicial combats agency
role) capture,
arbitrariness;
protects citizens
from bureaucracy
4.3. Putting Substance over Form in Legal Technical Assistance
Now that these historical failings of Northeast Asian legality
have been recast as trade-offs on a series of policy continua, is it
possible to forge from it something that can contribute positively to
the law and development literature, rather than serving simply as
material for critique? The answer is yes, but to do so, it will be
helpful to see mainstream law and development literature as
overly influenced by Max Weber's ideal type of formal legal
rationality, which he argued was bound up in important ways
with the development of modern capitalism.2 66 For Weber, the
"formal" in formal legal rationality meant that legal reasoning
referred only to the internal logic of the legal system itself, not to
"substantive" value systems or ideologies. 267  In his view, this
resulted in a high degree of autonomy for law, and maximized the
predictability of legal outcomes to private actors.268 Substantive
265 MARK TILTON, RESTRAINED TRADE: CARTELS IN JAPAN'S BASIC MATERIALS
INDUSTRIES 29 (1996) (citing ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NExT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA
AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION 8 (1989)).
266 See Trubek, supra note 16, at 722 (delineating Weber's concept of legal
formalism as tied into sociological theory).
267 See id. at 733. (discussing the importance of formal legal rationales to
create general rules).
268 See id. at 737-38 (holding that reason actors obey the law is because they
believe the law is rational).
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rationality, on the other hand, prevailed when non-legal value
systems, such as Confucianism, informed the reasoning of legal
decision makers. 269 Although not exactly reproducing Weber's
ideal-types, each of the law and development orthodoxies
discussed here betrays its own variant of formalist thinking, which
renders it incompatible with the Northeast Asian experience.
The modernization orthodoxy has been criticized for simplistic
assumptions about law, 270 although in its understanding of legal
formalism as a problem it evidenced much more sophistication
about how legal systems work than its successors. More important
was the formalism that that approach displayed in its idea that
modernized legal institutions, staffed by modernized people,
would produce reliably modern outcomes, with "modern"
meaning outcomes that essentially conformed to mid-twentieth
century American ideals. The formalism inherent in the
Washington consensus rule of law orthodoxy shares some of the
aspects of its predecessor, in the idea that "getting the rights right"
is the key to thriving markets, for example, but also takes a much
more formalist approach to law itself, thus calling for something
much closer to Weber's formal legal rationality. 271  Formal
rationality calls for legal systems to operate and evolve with no
particular substantive societal goal, guided only by the internal
logic of the legal order, as understood by the trained adept. Even if
the rule structure were set up in a way that would seem conducive
to market-oriented growth, however, given the indeterminacy
inherent in any legal order, the internal logic of the legal order
cannot be trusted to keep the operation of the system oriented
toward growth. And while property rights were obviously
important in the market economies of Northeast Asia, given the
diminished role for litigation as the "enforcer" of property rights as
well as the noted tendency towards informality in contracting
behavior and in organizational form, it is clear that the relationship
between the written law and the behavior of economic actors was
far more complex than the orthodoxy.
The legal origins proto-orthodoxy is prone to similarly
formalist tendencies, as it radically overestimates the closeness of
269 Id.; see also MAX WEBER, THE RELIGION OF CHINA (Hans H. Gerth trans.,
1951) (depicting adjudication of disputes by traditional Chinese magistrates as
being driven by substantive, extra-legal concerns).
270 Trubek & Galanter, supra note 38.
271 For Weber's typology of legal systems, see Trubek, supra note 16.
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the fit between formal rules and structures and real economic
behavior, an overestimation on which the plausibility of its
formalist methodology depends. Finally, like the modernization
approach, the comprehensive development approach assumes that
the social outcomes it desires will be obtained if the specific legal
rules and institutions it supports will perform the functions
assigned to them in the theory.
The existing orthodoxies are prone to these kinds of formalism
for two reasons. The first, discussed above, is that organizations
that do law and development work are staffed by people who need
generally applicable frameworks that they can apply around the
world, and frameworks of that sort are prone to formalism. It is
not simply the need for generally applicable ideas that is the
problem, however, but the fact that the actual substantive results,
the societal ends which law and development activities should be
serving, become secondary to the task of creating the legal rules
and institutions that the various orthodoxies claim produce those
outcomes. In the words of one long-time World Bank law reform
practitioner: "[t]he conventional approach sees legal and judicial
reform as an intrinsic good, based on the belief that once legal
concepts and institutions of a particular model are established,
positive development outcomes will follow -economic, social and
political." 272
What is needed, then, is not a new orthodoxy based on what
we think happened in Northeast Asia, but a new approach to law
and development. That new approach would reject the existing
practice, in which successive models are presented as the solutions
to the development problem, an inescapably formalist approach.
Rather than presenting yet another model, the new approach
would engage with developing countries based upon something
like Table 1 in Section 4.2.5., recasting areas of law as continua
along which successful legal systems vary, and offering realistic
appraisals of the tradeoffs involved. In other words, legal technical
assistance would consist of presenting legal reform issues as we
actually think about them ourselves, as ridden with tradeoffs, so that
where a legal system falls on a particular dimension is important,
and not whether property rights are "secure," or some other
abstraction. The presentation would include such evidence as we
have about how successful economies have approached these
272 Gopal, supra note 235.
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tradeoffs, and it would be through these appraisals that Northeast
Asia's experience could make an enormous contribution, rather
than as the basis for yet another orthodoxy. And because
individual legal fields are very often related, the approach would
include such evidence as we have of the ways that choices about
one area of law or legal institution might affect others- even if one
thought, despite Northeast Asia's experience, that developing
countries should aim for a high level of functioning in all the areas
of law contained in the chart above, in a world of limited resources
that is not a realistic possibility. Thus another important
contribution of the approach outlined here is that it could be used
to help prioritize among various reform possibilities. For example,
countries with relatively clean, competent bureaucracies might
decide not to devote as many resources to administrative law
reform, while countries with strong science education and a desire
to foster domestic industry, such as China today, might choose to
postpone heavy investment in intellectual property protection until
such protection is demanded by local IP owners.
In a macro sense, the Northeast Asian experience suggests that
if the goal is economic development, the legal system as a whole
should operate in a mode more similar to Weber's substantive
rationality than to his formal rationality, with the "substance"
provided by a commitment to industrialization and economic
growth. This does not mean copying the specific policy decisions
of Northeast Asian economies, because the realm of available
policy options is constantly changing, and because that would
constitute yet another questionable orthodoxy. It would mean,
however, approaching the legal system as a tool that should be
operated to achieve rapid economic development, which would
tend to shift the focus from rules and institutions to outcomes.
Such outcomes might be controversial, in the sense of favoring
accumulation over redistribution, management over shareholders,
and industrialization over the environment, but they might not. At
least these important distributional questions would be out in the
open, rather than being clouded by rhetoric.
What changes would be required under this new approach?
The most important would be for law and development activities
to move up a level of engagement, to focus on providing options
based upon experience instead of providing answers. In order to
do this, it would be very useful to take a team approach to staffing
law and development projects, with teams to include both common
law and civilian lawyers, but also lawyers from successful
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developing countries. It would also be crucial for legal assistance
providers to abandon the idea that their job includes pursuing
some broader agenda, such as maintaining the international
financial system or the WTO. There is a tendency to want all good
things to go together, to want what is good for any particular
developing country to also be good for the rest of the world. It is
clear from the Northeast Asian experience that sometimes
countries benefit from behaving strategically in their interactions
with the world, however, so if we really want to help them we
should focus on their particular development concerns, and let
someone else worry about maintaining the international economic
order. Even if strategic behavior is never actually helpful,
however, it seems that economic nationalism has played an
important role in Northeast Asia's success. Most developing
countries are too insignificant economically for a bit of nationalism
to endanger the world economy, and the big countries such as
China can largely ignore legal assistance efforts that they think are
not in their interests. The world should encourage developing
country governments to be concerned, first and foremost, about
national development, even at the expense of their trading partners
or the international economic order. Finally, legal assistance
practitioners would need to be able to separate themselves from
their own national experience, to be open to the fact that something
might be useful to a developing country even though their own
country has moved away from that practice. This would reject
simple "best practices" approaches, which assume all countries of
the world have essentially the same needs, in which case there
might actually be a set of non-controversial, apolitical,
scientifically-verifiable "best practices." Best practice for a
developing country today might be the Korean corporate
governance in the 1970s, for example, rather than Korean corporate
law as of 2005, let alone United States corporate law.
Moving up a level of generality and adopting a "substantive
rationality" approach would also help ameliorate the "legal
transplant" problem that has bedeviled law and development
activities from the beginning. Outsiders would be out of the
business of advocating particular rules with particular results in
mind, so the problem of rules not transplanting with the intended
functional results would disappear. And while outsiders would
still advocate for basic institutions such as courts, securities
regulators, patent offices, or antitrust authorities, it would be
recognized that such institutions can play a variety of roles even in
[Vol. 28:2304
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successful market economies, and certainly during development.
The question then becomes whether the various institutions are
functioning so as to support or to impede economic growth, not
whether they have been effectively "transplanted." New rules and
institutions will often not function as anticipated, and while being
aware of the transplant problem is useful, the new model's
"substantive rationality" calls for continuous monitoring and
adjustment,273 rather than unrealistic expectations followed by
followed by exasperation.
Putting this approach into practice would place serious
demands on those involved, because a substantive rationality
approach would require accurate and continuous monitoring of
affected legal systems, to see whether the goals of particular areas
of law were being met, and to facilitate intelligent adjustments if
not met. Adjustment would necessarily involve learning by doing,
not by rote, or by hectoring. If donor governments or
organizations want to place conditions on their law and
development assistance, the appropriate conditions should also
become "substantive" rather than formal, being based not on
whether the new rule or institutions exist on paper, but on whether
the recipient government was taking seriously the task of
monitoring and adjusting the new legal rules or institutions so as
to facilitate economic growth. Because one of the dimensions
along which all legal systems fluctuate involves the twin concerns
of stability - to facilitate private planning, and flexibility - to allow
necessary change, the processes by which adjustments would be
made would also be open to evaluation.
Finally, moving up a level would help solve the intractable
problem of political interference by allowing the local political
process to take responsibility for making the decisions that will
affect where the legal system will land on the various continua.
Law and development orthodoxies contain within them political
choices, and offering an empirically-based menu of options, rather
than yet another orthodoxy, puts the choices up front, for all to see.
As the example of Korea's post-Financial Crisis reforms show, the
fact that international institutions get invited in by a particular
government does not make reforms non-political; it just means that
273 See Gopal, supra note 235, at 5 (calling for "programmatic flexibility to
'tweak' interventions until they are able to produce the desired outcomes/results"
which "will call for continuing adjustments at the policy and operational level by
implementing agencies").
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the foreign organization is acting in league with the particular
faction holding power, but perhaps completely against the wishes
of the domestic opposition. When South Korea needed to be bailed
out by the IMF and World Bank in 1998, President Kim Dae-Jung, a
life-long opponent of authoritarian politics and the chaebol-
dominated economy, was trying to transition to an entirely new
political economy, from bank to financial market financing, to anti-
cartel policies rather than cartel supervision, to corporate
governance reforms to limit the powers of chaebol families, and to
bankruptcy reform to try to make the formal legal system more
relevant. While this was all obviously economic, essentially trying
to move Korea closer to U.S.-style economic governance, it was
also highly political because it constituted a direct attack on the
powerbase of the political opposition, the conservatives and their
chaebol supporters. For the IFIs to take sides in this was not only
political interference in the most formal sense, but it also makes
one wonder about the "participatory" or "ownership" claims of the
legal assistance providers. Lining up a coalition of local politicians
and civil society groups to enact, over the objections of a sizeable
political opposition, a particular set of rules which have obvious
distributional consequences, makes the legal assistance providers
direct players in local politics. Given the fact that law and
development orthodoxies cannot seem to make sense of the
Northeast Asian development miracle, there is reason to doubt that
just getting the right set of rules in place is ever going to be the
answer. Moreover, unless local politics can be permanently
suppressed, a method that crams down a set of rules or institutions
over the objection of a significant opposition cannot achieve
"ownership," but is likely to be either subverted in
implementation, or reversed when political fortunes change.
5. CONCLUSION
Until perhaps very recently, Northeast Asia's legal systems
have conformed to none of the orthodoxies of law and
development, yet these were the systems in place as their societies
underwent the most successful episodes of economic development
in modem history. This is obviously a problem with the ways in
which the theories have been produced, which have not included
careful study of Northeast Asia. Yet what is needed is not a new
orthodoxy in which whatever we think Northeast Asia did would
be reduced to a template, to be imposed on today's developing
[Vol. 28:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/1
DEVELOPING DEVELOPMENT THEORY
countries. Rather, what is needed is a new approach that learns
from Northeast Asia, but that also recognizes the limits of the ways
in which past law and development orthodoxies were used.
This Article sets out the foundations of a framework to inform
the work of law and development providers. But can providers
such as the IFIs, USAID, or JICA adopt the approach suggested
here, to help developing countries orient their legal systems
toward a substantively rational emphasis as outlined above? One
precondition would seem to be that the IFIs adopt a perspective
that allows them to advance the interests of particular developing
countries even if those interests conflict with interests of developed
countries, or of the international community. The points at which
Northeast Asia's legal systems settled on the performance continua
discussed above have been problematic from the perspective of
foreigners wanting to participate in their economies, and the
globalization of investment and finance only makes this worse.
Local disregard for minority shareholder rights, for example, was
not a matter of concern for foreign investors in high-growth
Northeast Asia because their access to portfolio investment was
substantially limited. Likewise, foreign lenders to the region were
not that concerned about local insolvency regimes until they
started lending to local private borrowers, not governments, and
until governments stopped supervising the process and providing
explicit or implicit guarantees.
At present, the dominant mindset seems to be that there can be
no conflict between local and foreign interests because foreign
interests represent the market, so their wishes become the
benchmark for proper market economy regulation. With
something as technical as economic law reform, however, it seems
likely that there will be many specifics that can be handled so as to
promote local investment and industrialization that will not matter
much to foreign actors. The IFIs must at least be able to focus on
what is best for individual developing countries when looking at
these factors. If they and other law and development practitioners
can get that far, then they should try to encourage developing
countries to orient their legal systems towards assisting economic
development in a substantively rational way. This will raise a host
of practical problems, but at least these problems will be visible.
While current law and development scholarship seems to
support reliance on formal models, such an approach only
obscures necessary policy choices in favor of a focus on formal
rules and institutions, and the success rate of such approaches has
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not been high. The problem begins when models are built that
purport to explain law's role in economic development, but that
ignore the functioning of law in the Northeast Asian miracle. As
was recently said of a theory purporting to explain the rise of "total
war," "any theory of total war where the First World War is a
distraction sounds like a theory of something other than total
war." 274 Likewise, a theory of law and development can come to
terms with Northeast Asia. The difficulties continue when the
implementation of law reform projects is overtaken by a formalist
logic which assumes that if certain reforms are enacted the desired
results will follow. Projects thereby become self-referential,
judging themselves based on how they have changed the legal
system, rather than on how they have affected social reality. The
goal of this Article is to offer a way forward based upon a new
method for creating law and development theory, and a new
approach for law and development practice.
274 Adam Gopnik, Slaughterhouse: The Idealistic Origins of Total War, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 12, 2007, at 82-83 (reviewing DAVID A. BELL, THE FIRST TOTAL WAR,
NAPOLEON'S EUROPE AND THE BIRTH OF WARFARE AS WE KNOW IT (2007)).
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